


JPRS-UMJ-90-002

25 APRIL 1990



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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Military History Journal
No 9, September 1989

Soviet Union

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 9, September 1989

JPRS-UMJ-90-002

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25 April 1990

[The following are translations of selected articles from the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL published in Moscow. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

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MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 9, 1989

THE WRITER'S TRIBUNE

Army and Culture

904P0003A VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 9, Sep 89 (signed to press 9 Sep 89)
pp 3-14

[This is the concluding installment; for previous installments, see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Issues No 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 for 1989]

[Text] Both the Afghan veterans and the young Nakhimov sailors—in a word, all the lycee students, the Yermolov students and the poets—everyone has returned from the army, the school, the clubs and the hikes back to the home, to the most mysterious, the most unfathomably deep, the wisest of anything created by man in this world. There is no greater fortune than to return home. "Honor your father and your mother and you will live long on earth." No creative work in the world and any other scientific and production joys can compare with the warmth, the happiness and the creativity of the family. All paths lead home. There is no more noble activity than to make a nest, plant a garden and raise children. They say that to recognize your pain provides the hope of escaping from it.

"At present, what we have is not an unmasking of the repressions, but rather some yellow-journalism relishing of them with the ascribing of all the sins, both ours and others, to one 'leader of remission'." In a majority of the articles there is not even a shadow of any pain. Everyone is running to amaze one another with a new inventory of figures. The victims are turned into the raging abstraction of figures. The account is kept merely by the number of shots in the back of the head. The essentially covert propagandizing of violence comes down to this and it must be stopped. Children without immunity are growing up in a new newspaper- and magazine-inspired bloodbath. Here is PRAVDA writing that during collectivization, a million families were repressed. At the very end comes the main word, family. Just imagine what a million families are—this is a decent European state with children, elderly, fathers and mothers.

In 1933, again the Russian family was crucified. This was equal to yet another state.

In the 4th year of the Eastern faculty, I by chance became the leader of an orphan camp on the Karelian Isthmus and was left alone with 80 students without any leaders, heads, swimming instructors and other staff. Alone in front of all of them. I requested and during the first week received the "Pedagogical Poem" of Makarenko. Since then, many years have passed but the sensation of terror has remained. Possibly this was the profound influence of the old legends and the Old Believer environment in

which I grew up, where people still preserved an eschatological conscience. I never told anyone about my impression in order not to shock the unidimensional mind of the optimists. But, I thought about myself and while he had homeless children I had orphans. How is it possible to write a brilliant book about young people without having once before this describing to them, these unfortunates, the legends of their fathers, about the sources and about our ground? They were not only without father and mother, for there is no greater bitterness than that of an orphan for they are still in the colony outside the wire fence. Without having told them the history of the motherland, without having provided culture, they develop a taste for a machine tool and conveyor and all of this with imaginary self-control which does not exist in nature, for there is only co-control. Platonov called this a "pedagogical pot." To take away and murder the fathers at night to the roar of truck engines and then send the children to a penal colony, and all of this is then turned into a poem, and all with a false enthusiasm where there is just as much authenticity as there is of it in the racing of a motor in the garage. This is the racing of enthusiasm to cover up the murdered families of these children.

Makarenko established labor education with a circumscribed memory. He and his now completely lifeless followers want their children to study in the university while the others in a happy barracks will "work hard" at a trade or in a PTU [vocational-technical school]. Labor education is still the roaring of the truck. And this same roaring can be heard in the stupefying raging of fate. I set aside this terrible poem of dual orphanhood, a book written after 1933. At that time and now I consider it the most terrible book which has ever been written in Russian. I can clearly distinguish the rejoinders and I understand them. With much I was previously in agreement. I am told that at that time this was a good thing. But I feel that it was a good thing when he was ordered to stop extolling child labor. The point is not at all Makarenko himself, not at all his commonplace maxims. The issue was, as Dostoyevsky said, "a child weeps," and the motor still roars. How can people read such a "poem" without shuddering?

After 1928 and 1933, three peoples—the Russians, Ukrainian and Belorussians—through the innocent children lying stiff along the roads, through the mountains of corpses in this grief merged into a unity which had not been known by the earth since the day of creation. The slaughtered family became the first symbol in history of a national experience. The crucified family.... Silence. Man has no words for this. For this reason the people are silent while the magazines chatter. The people understand that this is unutterable.

After 1933, there was the war to endure! And how many millennia did the Belorussians, Russians and Ukrainians still have in reserve?! After 33, after a grief more terrible than the Mongol hordes there were no more Eastern Slavs, and there was something higher than the tribal

differences of the three fraternal peoples as in this world none had experienced what they had.

After the right-Russian war against Naziism, it was not the Russians, the Belorussians and the Ukrainians who entered Berlin, but rather it was the Orthorus ["pravorossy"]. Since the pre-Christian times, the word "right" had meant "honest," "just," "true" and "right." At that time they said: "The world is bent and God will straighten it out." The Orthorus straightened out the world. The Orthorus were not only an ancient fraternal unity of sources and blood but also a new spiritual unity which has reappeared in Damansk, Afghanistan and Chernobyl. The Orthorus are a unity for the new millenium and upon this unity depends the fate of the power created by their sacrifice. It was they, the Orthorus, having given up all the borderlands even after the tortures of 33, at present are behind all republics in terms of the standard of living, education and benefits. They went through the most terrible hardships which befell the family. It took many decades to kill the family and so they killed the father. The well-known Academician Nadirov, a Kurd by nationality, related how in those years they came once at night and asked where was the head of the family. The father was no longer living. The entire family for better or worse was supported by the elder brother, 22 years old. They took him off so that the young would be beheaded. The remainder were loaded into railway cars and sent beyond the Urals. Then all was silence.

They also killed the father in the movies. Patricide was made poetic. As in the film "We From Kronshtadt." They were recruiting volunteer sailors for a cruise. One of them with a guitar asked that he be selected and as proof of his fitness said that he was the son of a cook and an officer. To the question of the sailors as to where the father was now, he replied proudly:

"I turned him over to Cheka!"

Pavlik Morozov, that unhappy lad, was not alone. There was Lavrenev's "Forty First." A terrible reckoning of murder. The woman killed fathers. Now we know that 80 percent of the officer: before October were children of the peasantry. The last she killed was not only a high nobleman, a lieutenant, but also the bearer of an aristocratic last name, the Slavophile Govorukhu-Otrok who was known before the revolution. Even at that time with the awful accounting, they were able not to forget about ritual symbols. But both the sailor and the murderess were not a perfect fabrication. We recognized them. In their features is the violence of the Razins, Pugachevs, Bolotnikovs and Makhnos and in their bad ardor so many kindred features that it is terrible to recall. Even in the violent nonresistance of the "declassé" Count Tolstoy. And "Brothers Karamazov" is all the same "to kill father or not."

But there is yet another, main component in this phenomenon which has emerged from the people and which was inherited by the Bolsheviks and without which it is

impossible to understand either the October Revolution or all its consequences. Bolshevism was the Russian dream. This ecstatic thirst for truth and precisely Bolshevik truth I can find for you both in the "Blue Book" in the "Tale of Sorry Ill Luck" and even in Illarionov's "Law and Grace," let alone in the self-immolations of the Old Believers. In no one is there such ardent "Bolshevism" as in the Archpriest Avvakum Petrov. It is incorrect that the ungifted, vain Trotsky brought down a great people.

Pugachev quite successfully hanged entire families of noblemen with their children. The Russian people in the person of their proletariat accepted Bolshevism as a national undertaking. Read the memoirs of Zhukov, as he does not lie, leaf through the memoirs of Konev, the peasant son from the Vologda area or the peasant lad from Moscow Meretskoy. It is not correct that everything began with the setting of the soldiers against the officers and ended with the election of company officers and all the rest, supposedly, is the workings of Trotsky with his morality of "if you wish to live be able to swing." Everything began much earlier.

Bolshevism was a Russian testing, it was an orthorussian world lesson, a tragic testing of fate, where everything was abandoned in the search for truth. The result is well known. The person who ascribes the misdeeds of these years to a Trotsky or a Stalin (that is, to Bronshteyn or Dzhugashvili), this person belittles a great people and all its victims and most importantly shows that he, like the founders of the GULAG, has nothing in common with the Russian people or with Russian fate. The orthoruss were the driving force (as the Marxists say) of the revolution. And by Zhukov's hand they put an end to this era, having engendered in the person of the general not a destroyer but a creator.

At present, a new stage of the greatest responsibility confronts the new generations. Memorial has estimated its losses and the Russian people sum up their own results. Everyone was involved and deceived. It is enough to rinse the bloody linen. There is no place in the new Russia for a Trotsky, a Bukharin, a Stalin or a Khrushchev. Again we must raise children and on the expanses of Russia, Belorussia and the Ukraine folk songs must again be sung and large families flourish.

Never has there been and nor is there now on this earth any greater good fortune than children. And the more there are the greater the good fortune. As the scripture says, "woman is saved by childbearing." Women were deceived with false values. The Russian women, the most beautiful in the world, were distracted into sterility, degeneration and boorishness. Nowhere in the wide world does anyone wait so for a woman as her children.

And let the man again become what he was in all ages of hardship, the head and carrier of the family's conscience. And there are promising beginnings. Just look who seeks out, purchases and pays 5 rubles for a copy of the magazine SEMYA and it is only men. At one time each

family was a little church. The heavenly father there and on earth the father in the family and between them the axis on which stood the world. And in the corner of honor of each domestic church, ikons instead of altars.

The time of atonement is over. It is time for us to return quietly home. Turn off the television set. Throw out the scarce and imported goods. Have a wash. Sit silently and reflect together on the great responsibility which never before has rested on the shoulders of any generation and this is to restore the large Russian crucified family. There is no other way.

But children cannot flourish and develop either in a family or in a state without the protection of paternal force. In the family this role is performed by the head, the man. And in a state by the people who are named men.

What has remained for us from the Russian millennium? The Orthodox Church is stirring. There is the word, the chronicles, songs and legends. But they, like children, need development and protection. On the pillars of churches they have drawn soldier princes and have given the parishoners a visible lesson of majesty. But who today in our state can bear the historic burden? Who is the bearing structure? Who is the support of the state? Above all, the Army and Navy and then everyone who bears the ancient state service. These are the men in shoulder straps, the lawyers, the police, the civil air fleet, the river and maritime fleets. These are the railroad workers and the border troops and the workers of the security and diplomatic services. And they are all led by the party. And they all together have now come under a particular direct and secret attack both merited and unmerited. They should all assemble together under party leadership and decide first of all how to send home the overfatigued female teachers who are tortured by the educational methods and by the raucous overcrowded class. There is someone to come to the aid of education. The men in shoulder straps are the support of society, its hope and conscience.

The writers are busy settling their own scores and are in no hurry to turn to childhood and the fundamental tasks of the people. All hope rests on you. In order to be faithful to the Zhukov tradition and to the tradition of the general to the renewal of society, all who wear shoulder straps should establish officer assemblies. No one will help the Army and Navy except themselves. When steel is hardened it for a time is "tempered" in order to make it flexible and cutting, otherwise it will be brittle and break. The same is true of education and the same is true of the officer corps.

The officer assemblies were introduced into the troops as a rescue measure against "overheating." Unquestioningness is the soul of the army, its strength and hope. But it is harmful in officer life, where a corporative fraternity replaces obedience. In the Navy, to a certain degree, this role is performed by the wardroom. The sailors wisely gave the first role in the wardroom not to the ship's

commander but to his first mate. For if the commander commands unconditionally on the bridge and is still "pressing" at the table, then the crew is "overtempered" and becomes bored. This does not mean that in an officer assembly after proper discipline comes a time of overfamiliarity. Quite the contrary. A relaxed fraternal meeting is a great tester of the officers for a feeling of tact, discipline, balance and honor. The assemblies can start from the battalion level. All the assemblies of a branch of arms are combined together in a single society. For example, the society of engineer troop officers. Or the society of airborne troop officers. They, incidentally, could become the instigators. As they said in olden times, "no one likes the guards but everyone tries to imitate them." There should also be a society of medical service officers. The officers of the border troops could begin to come together along with the airborne troops and sailors. They could establish, for example, a union of the state's officer societies. Each officer society should propose its own candidates to the Supreme Soviet for each society is truly a creative union, since there is nothing more creative in the world than education and there is no officer without an educator. There should be similar societies for the officers of civil aviation, the fishing fleet, river and rail transport and justice. This would immediately improve the climate in the nation.

During all these years were our press, our television, radio and film together with the army and the people on this high road? Let the reader answer for himself. At one time the famous hetera Athena went to Socrates and told the philosopher: "Listen, Socrates, all Hellas knows that in Athens there is no wiser man than you, but would you not agree that I could take any of your students away from you?" To this, Socrates calmly pointed out to her:

"But what is surprising in that? For I push them up and you push them down!"

Here is the question which each of us individually and as an aggregate should ask ourselves every day and that is: Do we assemble together in an auditorium, a cooperative, an artel, a plant, at the editorial offices or at a gorkom session? The youth requires responsibility, risk and tension because it wants to grow. But let the youth not forget that, as Herman Hesse said, age exists only for the ungifted.

We have deceived the children and led them along that road which the villain from the fable did. We destroyed both the artistic and the filial awareness of entire generations having imagined that in the world there exist a "youth problem" and "youth music." Unfortunate is the child if his problems are not the problems of his father. Equally unfortunate is the father if his concerns are not the concerns of his son. A gap nevertheless has occurred. The fathers did not pass on to their children the flames of the millennium. There are no problems of the fathers and children if there is just the problem of the fathers. The children are never to blame for they do not pass on. At one time, I had begun to establish in Siberia a muskateer club called "Victoria" with one supertask to

show that in the world there was no youth problem. Because according to the club bylaws members from 10 to 18 could meet there. Now we have raised our own home-grown, domestic dingbat who is under 40 and is still convinced that "youth music" can exist in nature. This dingy one feels that culture is something like footwear and trousers which have an age size. He, poor fellow, is convinced that the limit of political happiness is a two-party system and that everything in the West is better than at home. How can he know that after what his fathers and grandfathers experienced any congressman is an insipid chatterbox in comparison with them? Who has explained to him that the venerating of modern times is an indication of mental degradation? Who will tell him if those sitting much higher than him do not realize that there will never be sausages in the stores as long as economists teach the society and as long as conscience is not put in first place ahead of the stomach, for in the world there is nothing more of a loss than an absorption with profitability? And in the world there is no greater shame for a nation than to give the blood-covered land to lease to farmers from neighboring countries. And trade zones are zones of a barbarous understanding of the people's well-being.

At present, to the question of whether the Soviet Army can preserve the precious traditions of the Russian military, the answer is but one: the traditions, regardless of the devastating years of repressions and executions (for the officer corps these did not begin in 1937), regardless of the stagnation and even in spite of it, have been preserved and strengthened by that guarantee, using the words of Pushkin, the "combat obedience" shown at Damansk, in the Afghan mountains and near the lethal reactors of Chernobyl. For in the analysis and publishing of the GULAG files, the people's Army and Navy, we are hopeful, will not remain on the sidelines but will show high civil valor and purity. Will we remember that a hired army is a dependable indication of the decay of society even if this society has computers in the toilets? Who will show us the way, who will extend a hand to us during this time of futile tension, prostration and atrophy of will and dishonest confusion?

Russian history has more than enough such heroes. One of them could be Vladimir Monomakh who left us the miraculous and courageous "teachings" for children. The Monomakh of the 12th Century gave rise to the historical Ilya Muromets and this was a time of unity, of victorious battles against the Polovitsians, of complete daring and the play of young forces. This was the most poetic time in Russian history like the times of Pushkin. It was the century of "The Song of Igor's Campaign" the Pokorv-na-Nerli Cathedral, the age of the beginnings of Moscow. Monomakh, not sparing himself, bequeathed to his children and hence to us the words "be silent in the presence of elders, heed the wise, reside with equals and young people in love." But now we turn to the magic name of Pushkin. When there is so much miasma around us, we can be saved only by the smile of such a genius as he.

We are fortunate that Pushkin is always with us. So let us make use of this Russian happiness in difficult times when we must strengthen the family and for which Pushkin gave up his life. For there is no subject more important for the people and the party than Pushkin's ideal, and in the state there is no question more important than the family and there is no more absurd subject than the youth problem and there was never insulting "inquiries" in the newspapers directed to the minister of defense if officer societies were functioning and elections should be held only after their establishing so that there be real equality between citizens. Otherwise, it turns out that the representatives of the officer "creative unions" do not have their representatives in the parliament of the state for which they must die while the representatives of the "creative unions" and the scholars who not only do not risk their precious lives but go for advice overseas and sooner destroy the state foundations—they have their representatives in the Supreme Soviet. Only the officers themselves can set up the officer assemblies. If they wait for orders from above then this will no longer be a true officer assembly but the next semiofficial measure. An army does not live without the spiritual and moral activities of the officers. Why has the theater both in our country and abroad died out and there is scarcely anyone in the foreseeable future to galvanize it? It is because the theater flowered when it was fed by the pure springs of thousands of amateur circles across the expanses of the nation. Without the amateurs, it closed in on itself, it became professionalized and dried up. Narrow specialization is an irreversible evolutionary blind alley. The same thing has happened with our athletics. Without millions of small boys absorbed in chasing a ball or puck around the courtyards and empty fields, sports will not be alive. Before the revolution, each Russian sang 3 1/2 hours a day. In such a singing society great poet singers could not help but be born. Now in those same hours a person cannot tear himself away from the television. How can one sing? For the Army and Navy can be revived only by the officers themselves, without the suggestion that they meet. And in order that the union of officer societies of the state not be set apart, the police should be the first to establish their union after them. In 1988, 263 policemen died. The policemen should establish their society in the memory of those, of all of those who died on the job.

"We will not forgive ourselves or others for the negligence toward the good. The memory of the good protects all that is truly honest against forgetfulness. The truth about evil is necessary but it is not enough as it still does not urge for the good, and God knows whether evil will go. But the true memory of the good...arouses competition, develops strength and calls for sacrifice. Let us have more memory of the good" (I.I. Sreznevskiy). In the West there is the old folk saying of "settle where they sing." The person who sings does not think badly. Our people have sung well and hence have thought over the centuries. Even during the years of repression, they still sang more than in the years of stagnation so strong still before the war was the might of the thousand-year

spiritual inertia. In Russia the army in its noble undertakings never was just an armed force but primarily a cultural force, the bearer of the people's morality.

It is time to assemble the first conference of its sort where composers, military musicians, army political workers and writers would meet in order to work out measures to preserve the thousand-year tradition of the military song and band music. This is timely, in the first place, because the ancient folk art is going through difficult times under the pressure of the electric decibels, and secondly, the reduction of the army is not a mechanical task but a creative one. History reminds us that a good army is not a cumbersome army and on the battlefield small troops have more often defeated numerically superior forces.

Victory comes to the side which, in addition to modern weapons, throws onto the scales skillful organization, that is, military culture and spirit which in external terms is manifested in singing and in music. In reducing the army, we should simultaneously reinforce culture in the troops. If the army in the future is to economize on culture, then it will scarcely handle the negative phenomena in it. Our history provides impressive examples of the role of music in the life of the army and the people.

Nothing gives our army such inspiring force as singing and the fife. To the sound of the military pipes and the ringing of bells, at the end of the summer of 1380, emerging in three columns from the three gates of the Kremlin was a host "for all the Russian land with sharp spears." And in the place of a prayer were the vows of the soldiers to erect a church of all the holies in Kulishki in memory of those who did not return from Kulikovo Field.

Two years later from the Kremlin walls, the first cannons fired at the Tokhtamish hordes and proclaimed the birth of the Russian artillery.

Go another hundred years, more accurately to the year 1479, to the opening of the main cathedral of the nation, Uspenskiy Cathedral, dedicated to the unity of all Russian lands where a chorus of state singing ushers performed.

At that time, the market was expelled once and for all from the Kremlin, and the mighty fortress, once cleansed, was bright and resonant and even more was likened to a knight in a golden helmet.

The sovietologists lie when they shout that when the Bolsheviks broke the Russian cultural tradition. Even with severe losses, the people's army protected its traditions and soul. The choir of state singing ushers now sings in Leningrad. Not for a single day has it interrupted its singing and for 500 years now has intoned the crucial points of Russian history. Now this is the Leningrad Academy A Cappella Choir and formerly the Imperial one. The head of the American sovietologists, R. Pipes, is constantly shouting that the Russians do not hold to their traditions. Let us remind him. When the United

States was born, the world's best choir (and it has been recognized as such repeatedly) had already been singing for 300 years. This choir accompanied the Russian troops on all major campaigns. It was the originator of the chants which were to become the Russian military marching songs.

Ivan the Terrible was passionately taken with singing. He himself composed music for the choir and thrashed bad singers with a long reed. Peter [the Great] sang basso in this choir and in parades in his youth ceded the place of the drummer to no one. This same choir was to sing at the ceremonies in honor of the taking of Izmail by Suvorov. Suvorov said his famous: "Music doubles and trebles the army, with unfurled banners and loud music I took Izmail."

The stronger and the deeper the historical memory, the stronger the tie with the people. Band music accompanied all October days. This was clearly apparent when in the grenade shop of the Mikhelson Plant in April 1918, accompanied by military music, soldiers came in to take the first oath of loyalty to the revolution. Lenin was in the first row of Red Army men and said the oath with all. Then in a speech he urged the soldiers and workers to show iron revolutionary order and vigilance, having reminded them that while the worker was busy reorganizing life and making a revolution, the bourgeoisie would always steal toward power.

Band music is similar to revolutionary pathos, it brings out the heroic and epic and is popular at its basis. With good reason, Immanuel Kant, the greatest expert on aesthetics in the world, preferred band music to any other. He knew that band music, even if one wished, could not be depressive.

To the honor of the Army and Navy, it must be said that in our times, when basically music for the spinal cord is essentially in fashion, only the army has remained faithful to the old popular tradition of the band and chorus. Writing for military band were Kozlovskiy, Bortnyanskiy and Glinka, the officer of the Preobrazhenskiy Regiment Musorgsky, Maj Lyadov, Gen Cui, Gens Titov, and the combat Engr-Lt Myaskovskiy, while Capt-Lt Rimski-Korsakov for a decade directed all the bands of the Russian Navy. No, the domestic tradition has not been broken where the army acts as a cultural force!

On 19 March 1814, the band of the Ryazan Musketeer Regiment on the hill of Montmartre overlooking Paris climbed to the top of a windmill and struck up a Russian march there. Possibly Napoleon was correct when he said that the Russians were victorious due to their superior music. Some 84 Russian cannons were already aimed at Paris from the Montmartre hill. But suddenly the bands of all the other Russian regiments responded to the band of the Ryazan Regiment and Montmartre stuffed with death struck up a song. The French considered it wiser to send out truce negotiators and the Russian regiments ceremoniously entered Paris. In

honor of this event for 100 following years until March 1914, the Russian military bands throughout the nation celebrated this date as a national holiday. Great Russian composers conducted the composite band. The last was Rachmaninoff.

In 1867, at the Paris World Exhibit, the band of the Russian Cavalry Guard was among the best. Some 30 years later, the same triumph in the French capital was achieved by the band of the Preobrazhenskiy Regiment. And in 1972, the France Presse Agency announced: "The Band of the Ministry of Defense has conquered Paris having only one weapon, musical instruments."

This military formation was led by Gen Nazarov who had won fame for himself on the Kursk Salient as the commander of an airborne regiment. A graduate of the conservatory, he had been granted permission to leave the leadership of the band of the Northwestern Front and join the active army after an accelerated course at the Frunze Academy.

In November 1941, at the Moscow Parade on a snowy Red Square, this same band was conducted by Col Agapkin who was the creator of the immortal march "Farewell of the Slavic Girl." The Army and Navy cannot live without song and music. The institutions, plants, factories and kolkhozes—in a word, all the structures of society—can operate with music, but the armed forces cannot, for the basic principle of their life is the spirit [a pun, the same word as woodwind].

Mar Zhukov in 1944 founded the Institute of Military Conductors. It made no sense later to turn it into a faculty at the conservatory as this was a rather awkward symbiosis. Undoubtedly, the institute should be restored in our times of improvement and perestroika.

At present, the thousand-woodwind band at the parade is conducted by Maj Gen N. Mikhaylov and the demonstration band led by him under the Ministry of Defense is considered the best in the world. Particularly impressive is when 400 woodwinds of the composite band of the friendly armies begin playing. Then the music of Wagner is replaced by the "Knights' Symphony" of Borodin and after the "Polovitsian Dances" comes the "Knights' Gates" by Musorgski. Stasov impressed by the victory of the band of the Russian horse guard in Paris wrote: "The military bands are the proponents not only of military music but all sorts of music in the masses of the people, on the street, in the public garden, in processions, in each popular and national ceremony and to which the people always listen, as not just a military band, and by it the people learn something from the music...they are numerous everywhere and they have merely to be given an order and they set off wherever." Let us add for ourselves that they play free, unstintingly and with all their soul, confirming their blood link with the people.

This tradition has not been broken. In the mid-1930s, we can read in the article "Woodwinds": "The first personnel of Soviet woodwind musicians is now forming

under the conditions of the Red Army and this is not only a military force but also a major cultural one of our country."

At present, when the alien enfeebled strumming of the vocal-instrumental ensembles has begun to sicken many, the woodwind bands will again gain strength, for music engendered by the revolution and gravitating toward the squares and parks, popular and healthy, should become the musical accompaniment of perestroika. In contrast to the rock ensembles, the woodwinds even with a fervent imagination cannot be conceived of in a dark cellar. Just watch when a military band plays in a park, everything ambiguous, publicity-struck, enfeebled and alien flies from it like from the crow of a cock. Let us recall that in November 1917 at the Congress of Soviets, our power was born accompanied by the sounds of the band of the Pavlovskiy Regiment. The hour of the silver pipes praised even in the "Song of Igor's Campaign," will come and the army will make yet another contribution to the rebirth of the folk tradition.

Stasov wrote from Paris enormously impressed by the performance of the horse guard band which had stunned the French capital: "But what was special for us was that only our band performed national songs and our musicians played in concert...just Russian things."

The flower of the European educated public was literally stunned when the band played the bells and music was heard which before the revolution had been the real national anthem. This was "Glory, Glory, Russian People" from Glinka's "Ivan Susanin." This was the same music, as you recall, which commenced the Victory Parade on 24 June 1945.

All the force of the army lies in loyalty to our own roots. As we see, memory is a force and a vast force. M. Ippolitov-Ivanov in the 1930s wrote: "The Red Army in our socialist system is one of the strongest engines of musical culture among the masses of people.... It can be called the first musical preparatory institution for the masses of people."

This is also why we have been given a "truthful memory of the good" in order to perceive our army as a school of all the people for culture, uprightness, memory and value. Each young man tries to be admitted to a military school having in the depths of his heart precisely this image. Let us help him become certain of this ideal in order to be faithful to the memory of the international fraternity in arms of all the peoples of our fatherland. We can carry out our international duty completely only by maintaining loyalty to our own traditions. An officer should be a repository of memory, if you wish, as Suvorov said, he should be "the father of victory." Because memory, in using the words of Monomakh in his teachings for children, is "a man's concern."

At one time at the end of the war, the current Maj Gen N. Mikhaylov, as a small boy, without waiting for his father to return from the front, entered a military music school. At present, when there are a million orphans in

the nation, should we not set up under the future institute of military conductors a military music Suvorov school, recruiting gifted children in the orphanages? With such an approach to reducing the army, we will also be stronger both in military terms and morally healthier. Children in the army are like a smile from the troops. Boys ennoble the harsh military life and prevent the adults from becoming dull. Twice the military bands of our troops heralded the return of peace in Europe, in the spring of 1814 and in the spring of 1945. Has not the time come, having brought together both these springs, to restore the festivals of military band music so that our young people recall, using the words from the march of the Preobrazhenskiy Regiment the music of which at one time was played by the chimes on the Spasskiy Tower: "Glorious were our Grandfathers!" We are urged to do this by the "true memory of the good" and the people and their army imprint the truly good in music and song. If the band still plays and good singing is still heard across the expanses of the nation, we owe this now basically to our Army and Navy.

Similar ideas have evidently entered the heads of both the national mentors and the simple people of the West. How else can one explain that at present in the West and in America, the military subject is becoming the most fashionable and has already engulfed the university campuses of the United States. While 5 years ago no one would have wanted to see officers on the university grounds, now all the colleges are eagerly demanding lectures on military history. The officer has become again one of the most esteemed national figures, for in the age of cooperatives, trusts and corruption, only the army is loyal to the ancient "idealism." Our press has begun to sully the army so hurriedly that it seems to fear that this fashion of "the military" should arrive here.

The poet, Prince Petr Vyazemskiy, a participant in the Battle of Borodino and closest friend of A.S. Pushkin, said that the political image of the late Pushkin could be defined most completely as a "free conservative." "Free" bears with it a keen and strict readiness for fresh undertakings and changes; "conservative" would mean a noble loyalty to our roots and the fatherland.

A conservative means a preserver. At present, I feel, his hour has come when it is essential to preserve the foundations, the rivers, forests, the soil, the ozone layer, the family and peace. A free conservative is always a "zealot" of domestic glory but most importantly, a "free conservative" is always, as Officer Lermontov said, a "captive of conscience" and this is also Pushkin's legacy. All the assertions of this article would remain suspended in air or would be noble dreams divorced from the sweat, blood, fatigue and losses of army life, from the gray dust of the Afghan mountains, if our officer corps beyond the Hindukush had lost Pushkin's legacy. But what happened there in October 1988 is reminiscent of a miracle which is capable of renewing the entire nation. Thousands of soldiers refused to be discharged into the reserves before the full withdrawal of our troops. They refused in order to protect the new recruits from death.

This paternal deed by the 20-year-old men was inutterably noble. During the times of Aleksandr Nevskiy, some 700 mounted troops (about two present-day battalions of soldiers) were considered a large princely retinue. And here there were many thousands of battle-tested young men. They should now be ashamed for all those unkind words about the army, for those articles and broadcasts where they were unable to see the light which has always been kept by the officer corps. These "captives of honor" were already leading the "Afghan" horde to the Salang Pass. The presence of the "October volunteers" raised the moral scale of the entire army which the nation can be proud of. Now the society should endeavor to be the equal of the army, for such a victorious army has not been seen by our state over the thousand years of bloody conflict. These were not the soldiers of the Alpine Campaign of Suvorov who served 25 years and were crack professionals with a single belief. These were not Zhukov's soldiers after conquered Berlin. At that time, the entire nation was fighting and for peace, as they say, death is fine. Such a heavy plight had not befallen our troops. And suddenly an almost indifferent rear which had gone into a drugged ecstasy from the revelations a rear involved in imports and shady dealings was suddenly confronted with the "Russian fellows" who had again returned to us the "light of Russian comradeship" which had been prophesied by Taras Bulba in spite of the "mouse's nature" (his very words) of the new poets, the pets of stagnation who for the first time in our history were not with the army in the field but rather picking cotton overseas.

These thousands of volunteers who covered "their friends" put all the "Afghaners" within the old Russian tradition, for in our history after the "Caucasians" of Yermolov there will be the "Bulgarians" of Skoblev and then the "Turkestaners" and now in this same rank of soldiers who always fought on the frontiers of our fatherland there will be the "Afghaners."

Only the political bores with a "mouse's nature" could compare Afghanistan with Vietnam. Even our vilest enemies ultimately recognized as progressive Russia's actions on its southern frontiers which for a thousand years had been the source of invasions for it. It was no accident that precisely along these frontiers there grew up the Cossack lines and now the main military districts are located here. These thousands of soldiers who refused to leave the army to be discharged into the reserve or leave ranks are also the carriers of culture. Thus the "army" and "culture" have merged before our very eyes, giving all of us the hope of transformation.

No nation should be allowed to forget the names of the volunteers of October. They were organized in a separate honorary formation of reservists and merited the honor of passing through Red Square, as our tradition requires. This same award has been earned by all the "Afghaners" who by their fate and oath did not think of being discharged, those who under fire saved our boys, who preserved the traditions and made possible the deeds of the October volunteers.

According to the old unwritten standards, a fighting nation provides to the entire world a sort of report and takes an exam on how it lived before the first shots. Without concealing a single shortcoming, error or loss, we can say what has long been known by our foes: no one else has such an army. On all the staffs of the world, they know, although they do not bandy this about, that the strength of an army, with all conditions being equal, depends upon how much idealism there is in the officer corps. This category for many of our print organs, alas, is already unattainable and for this reason they merit pity. The presence of mercenaries in an army made up of professionals and women is the surest sign of an irreversible collapse and is something opposite to idealism and zeal and, certainly, real culture.

When Gogol prophesied the appearance in Russia of men of Pushkin's light-bearing type, he had in mind the "free conservatives" loyal to the motherland, for they had a future and not the person dealing in imports and who winks at Western schemers dreaming of the "denationalizing" of our thousand-year principles. Today, regardless of the social exposure, the hardship of life and the moves, the closest to all to Pushkin's idealism are those who wear the uniform, those who "are ashamed for the state," that is, above all, our officer corps, the guarantor of peaceful creative perestroika which the party is carrying out.

During all these notes, Pushkin has been our accomplice, teacher and measure, the Pushkin who began by imitating the decadent Western ideas and ended up with a profound acceptance of all the roots of Orthodox culture and perished defending these ideas. For today he is our standard. The author in this context would place himself in the category of free conservatives and is proud to belong to this Pushkin political tradition. Pushkin's spirit should be again, as during the poet's life, in the officer societies and in the officer families.

There is a future for the free conservatives. And let each combat arms in memory of the national genius create its own military lycee in addition to the Suvorov schools which all higher military schools should have under them. For grief to the people who forget that in Russia there has not been and is no title higher than an officer.

The soul of the people mysteriously and suddenly manifests itself, having emibed the experience of the millennia and most often at a turning point in time, as at an ancient crossroads, this voice rings in the thoughts of the young soldiers. A letter somehow arrived from Afghanistan to the performer of the "Song of Igor's Campaign" in the ancient Russian language Yuliya Malysheva from the soldier O.G. Shcherbinin. When the troops were moving deeper into other frontiers, he recalled another campaign: "When the Bug lay behind us and the bayonet cutting the evening darkness on the hill of the memorial of the Brest Fortress was growing distant, in my mind remained with sadness the Old Russian: 'Oh, Russian land, already far behind.'"

"And here, beyond the Hindukush, in the distant field, this subject is even closer. 'The night groaned, dark, the birds and beasts are agitated. And above the trees the wild call commanding the far and unknown lands to obey'..."

And this is about us! Here are the large white-winged eagles which can prevent helicopters from flying and crows—enormous, black, which have not been seen in Russia for 300 years. And the dushman by "impassable paths" tried to throw back History.... "And flows the deep grief through Russia in full stream." I tried to read the "Song" in the original but this was beyond me. But the "Song of Igor's Campaign" should be as it is. It should be read in Old Russian and without a knowledge of this no person can consider himself completely educated. This applies all the more to the officer corps among which at one time the "Song of Igor's Campaign" arose. The first year of any military school should begin with this great military song and resound in Old Russian which should be in the curriculum. The prerevolutionary military schools did not reach a true understanding of our own traditions. This is the task of our times and without solving this all perestroika in the army will be the next campaign of orders.

Japan commenced its industrial total offensive not with technology but rather with the Japanese language and "Japanness." If, for example, the military circles of our airborne troops begin the officer assemblies with the reading of the "Song" in Old Russian and then simultaneously with this a study of the history of the Russian state and the indispensable introduction of the old military songs and a study of the traditions of Russian officer ethics, then one can be certain that the improper scum will disappear like smoke. No army has the institution of political instructors. The opportunities of this institution are limitless if the political instructors will be the initiators of all new undertakings. The "Song of Igor's Campaign" possesses a powerful and renewing spiritual potential, for this song is sacred to the three fraternal peoples: the Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian. This is a song, a legacy of the first orhoruss from the times of Kievan unity. The hour has come for a new unity, an hour of "Russian comradeship" which was prophesied by the indomitable and noble Col Taras Bulba.

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FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE USSR MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

First Days of War in Documents

904P0003B VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 9, Sep 89 (signed to press 9 Sep 89)
pp 15-21

[Archival documents prepared by Col V.R. Zhuravlev, Capt A.S. Anufriyev and N.M. Yemelyanova; this

installment is the conclusion; for the beginning see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Issue Nos 5, 6, 7 and 8 for 1989]

[Text]

**POLITICAL REPORT FROM THE POLITICAL
PROPAGANDA DIRECTORATE OF THE
NORTHWESTERN FRONT TO THE MAIN
POLITICAL PROPAGANDA DIRECTORATE OF
THE RED ARMY**

5 July 1941

The aviation of the front has suffered heavy losses. At the outset of the war the Air Forces had: 343 bombers and 519 fighters.

As of 5 July, the front's Air Forces had: 64 bombers (including 57 SB and 7 Pe-2) and 154 fighters (14 MiG-3; 38 I-16, 74 I-53 and 28 I-15B). Thus, the losses were: 279 bombers and 365 fighters.

A majority of the lost aircraft was destroyed by the enemy's bombing of our airfields and a portion was destroyed by us during the retreat in order to prevent the enemy from capturing the aircraft.

Among the losses by the start of the war, a significant portion of the aircraft was nonoperational. For example, in the 31st Fighter Air Regiment out of the 37 MiG aircraft, 24 were not operational.

The data given on the losses show that the enemy has dealt a very great blow to our aviation. Suffice it to say that the 57th Air Division lost 82 percent of the aircraft available to it prior to the war, while the enemy destroyed 156 aircraft of the 8th Air Division on the ground (67 MiG-3, 20 I-16, 59 I-53 and 10 I-15 and others).

Such a large number of aircraft losses can be explained by the following:

1. By the surprise of the Nazi air raids against our airfields.
2. By the shortage of flight personnel and by the discrepancy between the presence of aircraft at the airfields and the number of pilots trained for flying the new equipment. For example, the 42d Fighter Air Regiment during the first day of the war had 100 aircraft but only 24 pilots, while the 15th Fighter Air Regiment had 54 MiG-1 aircraft and 23 pilots capable of flying them, while in the 6th Air Division with 236 bombers and fighters available there were 175 pilots to fly them.

The heavy losses of equipment led to a situation where, in the first place, the operations of our aviation on the first days of combat were disrupted and their combat

work restricted, secondly, a significant number of pilots remained without aircraft and, thirdly, most importantly, the enemy obtained air supremacy.

Presently the front's Air Forces are carrying out the following measures:

1. The aircraft with minor failures are being overhauled and brought to combat readiness by the unit forces. With the arrival of the mobile air shops from Moscow, the aircraft requiring major overhaul can be repaired.
2. The flight personnel without equipment, some 400 persons, has been sent to the central districts to obtain aircraft but they have not yet returned and it is not known when they will.

The available Air Forces of the front are now being used chiefly to aid the ground troops: they conduct reconnaissance, make raids against the accumulations of enemy troops and its bases and provide air cover for our units, airfields and supply depots. A majority of the flight personnel in combating the enemy has shown courage and valor.

The Deputy Commander of the 15th Fighter Air Regiment, Capt Dobzhenko, on the first day of the war made eight combat sorties. On the last sortie he intrepidly engaged a group of enemy aircraft. Fighting courageously and skillfully against the enemy, Dobzhenko downed two enemy aircraft. Then he perished heroically in unequal battle.

A flight of aircraft from the 61st Fighter Air Regiment under the command of Sr Lt Andreychenko engaged nine enemy aircraft in battle. The pilot from this flight, Sr Lt Kamysenko, got into a difficult situation. Several enemy aircraft were on his tail. Andreychenko hurried to his aid and downed one enemy aircraft and this helped out the comrade. Not being satisfied with this, Andreychenko stubbornly pursued the attack on the enemy. After extended combat, he perished heroically in unequal battle.

In the 15th Fighter Air Regiment, Sr Lt Dmitriyev, in fighting heroically against the enemy, downed three enemy bombers and Lt Shults downed two bombers and himself perished heroically.

The flight personnel of the 15th Fighter Air Regiment from 22 June through 1 July downed 13 enemy aircraft in air battles.

Similar examples are to be found in the other units.

Chief of Political Propaganda Directorate of the Northwestern Front, Brig Commissar Ryabchiy

TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 221, inv. 1362, file 18, sheets 33-34. Original.

FROM REPORT ON COMBAT WORK OF AIR FORCES OF NORTHWESTERN FRONT OVER PERIOD FROM 22 JUNE 1941 THROUGH 1 JULY 1942

21 July 1942[sic]

...The Air Forces units of the PriBOVO [Baltic Special Military District] by the beginning of the war had been trained on old equipment including the SB aircraft for the bomber aviation and the I-153 and I-16 aircraft for the fighter aviation.

The war caught the PriBOVO units in a period of transition to new equipment with the fighters to the MiG-3 aircraft in which two regiments were already flying and had mastered this aircraft while a portion of the bomber regiments was undergoing retraining on the Pe-2 aircraft outside the district.

In terms of the combat training level, the Air Forces units of the PriBOVO were capable of carrying out combat assignments during the day under visual flying conditions, at low altitudes, medium and high altitudes as part of flights and nine-plane elements. Individual crews, flights and night squadrons had been trained for instrument flying. Approximately 15 percent of all the bomber and fighter aviation personnel could fly under nighttime conditions and they were able to carry out combat missions under nighttime conditions only on a limited basis. The combat training of the units was carried out in accord with the regulations issued by the Red Army Air Forces for 1981...

Commander of 6th Air Army, Maj Gen Avn Kondratyuk
Military Commissar of the 6th Air Army, Brig Com-
missar Mashnin

Chief of Staff of the 6th Air Army, Col Storozhenko

TsAMO, folio 221, inv. 1374, file 15, sheet 8. Original.

POLITICAL REPORT OF POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF 6TH RIFLE DIVISION TO CHIEF OF POLITICAL PROPAGANDA DIRECTORATE OF WESTERN FRONT OF 5 JULY 1941

I am reporting on the combat operations of the formation and the work being done now in the formation's units being constituted.

As a result of the unexpected, treacherous attack on our country by artillery fire at 0400 hours on 22 June 1941, the personnel of over one infantry regiment, equipment and horses were immediately put out of action.

Simultaneously by artillery fire the personnel was put out of action of over one infantry regiment positioned on the Bug. The personnel of the combat engineer and signals subunits located in separate camps were also taken in the heavy shelling.

The area of the fortress and the fortress itself came under exceptionally heavy bombarding. The enemy with the first artillery rounds put out of commission a majority of

the command personnel living inside the fortress and around it. Simultaneously, all the remainder such as the artillery parks, the stables, garages, dumps and staffs were the first objective of the bombarding.

Conclusion: up to 3/4 of the personnel, over 90 percent of the equipment of the divisional and regimental artillery and an equal percentage of horses were the victim of crimes perpetrated by the Nazis and unheard of in terms of treacherousness and vileness. Under these exceptionally difficult conditions, the personnel fought, demonstrating examples of heroism and valor in defending each inch of Soviet land.

For example, the personnel of the 95th Separate Anti-tank Battalion headed by the battalion commander, Capt Nikitin, being unable to reach the artillery park which was being fired on by the enemy, rushed into a bayonet assault with most of the personnel headed by the commander being killed and severely wounded. There is information that the battalion commander, Capt Nikitin, was severely wounded.

The battery of Comrade Leontyev (the 246th Separate Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion) which was the antiaircraft battery on duty with two of its weapons accurately hit the air enemy, knocking out seven enemy aircraft. Particularly distinguishing themselves were the following comrades, the battery commander Lt Leontyev, the gunner Glushkov, the Red Armyman Korol, the Red Armyman Slonets.

The battery of Sr Lt Chemezov (204th Howitzer Artillery Regiment) was firing directly from all firing positions at the crossings, opposing the enemy crossings to our territory.

It is essential to particularly point out the men who distinguished themselves: Comrade Kalyuzhnyy, the acting commander of the 2d Battalion, Red Armyman Tolmachev, Lt Strepetov, the political instructor Kuzmenko.

The surviving personnel at a distance of 6-7 km from Brest was reorganized into separate groups and detachments which took up the defensive fighting the advancing enemy. The detachments numbering from 100 to 150 men were led by the following commanders: the 333d Rifle Regiment by Col Matveyev, the 84th Rifle Regiment by Maj Dorodnykh, the secretary of the DPK [divisional party committee], Btln Commissar Nelepa, the senior instructor for party organizational work, Col Kryuchkov, and the remaining personnel of the OPP [political propaganda department] working in the subunits.

By the evening of 22 June 1941, under the effect of superior enemy forces, a large portion of the personnel was out of commission. The commanders, Col Matveyev and Maj Dorodnykh, were killed.

During the night of 23-24 June, the remaining subunits of the formation in the area of Zhabinka, Kartuz-Bereza,

continued fighting. During the period from 24 through 30 June, the personnel remaining from the 6th Division participated in fighting in other units. From 1 July 1941, a start was made to reconstitute the formation's units.

Chief of the Political Propaganda Department of the 6th Rifle Division, Reg Commissar G. Pimenov

TsAMO, folio 208, inv. 2526, file 27a, sheets 334-338 verso. Original.

POLITICAL REPORT FROM THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE XI MECHANIZED CORPS TO THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN FRONT OF 15 JULY 1941

The attack by Nazi Germany caught the XI Mechanized Corps unsupplied with materiel. There were the following tanks: 242 T-26, 18 flamethrowers, 44 BT-5, 24 T-34 and 3 KV. T-26 and BT-5 tanks made up chiefly the combat training fleet received from other units to bring up to strength.

Up to 10-15 percent of the tasks were unable to go out as they were undergoing repair. The artillery regiments were not fully equipped with guns, control instruments, tractors and motor vehicles. The corps had 10-15 percent of the motor vehicles needed. The motorcycle regiment with a machine gun battalion, a signals battalion and the pontoon bridge battalions were completely without engineer and special equipment. The corps signals battalion had one 5-AK radios out of the supposed 19.

There were absolutely no maps of the topographic areas of combat. The personnel levels were as follows: 100 percent for rank-and-file (including up to 60-65 of the May induction), up to 60 percent of the junior command personnel of the motorized rifle division and 13-30 percent for the other units of the corps and up to 60 percent for the command personnel. The political propaganda department had completely no instructor personnel.

The political morale of the corps units, both before the events and in the period of the events, was completely good and this was manifested in the period of fighting against the Nazis.

On the first day, that is from the moment of the German air raid on Volkovysk at 0400 hours on 22 June, there was no contact with the staff of the 3d Army and the district staff and the corps units independently entered the area of Grodno, Sokolki, Indur according to the elaborated cover plan.

Upon the combat alert, all the units moved up the personnel with weapons and capable of fighting, and this was 50-60 percent of all the personnel, while the remaining personnel was left at the positions of the units and from these a portion was armed subsequently and employed to combat enemy aviation in the rear as well as partially retreating with the retreating troops. Due to the

lack of motor transport the 204th Motorized Rifle Division of the first echelon moved by motor transport from the area of Volkovysk, while the following units moved by a combined march. After 7 hours (the 29th Tank Division after 3 hours and the 33d Tank Division after 4 hours) from the declaration of a combat alert, the corps units had occupied the concentration area and because of the retreat of our units from the frontier went over to an offensive along the front of Lipsk, Novyy Dvor, Dombrovo. Due to the retreat of the rifle units from the IV Rifle Corps, the entire burden of combat rested on the units of the XI Mechanized Corps both in terms of covering the retreat of the units of the IV Rifle Corps as well as checking the German advance; a motorized rifle regiment from the 29th Tank Division, upon orders of the commander of the 3d Army, was in his reserve to combat airborne troops in the area of Grodno, and the division fought without infantry and artillery, suffering particularly heavy losses from the enemy antitank artillery.

During 22 and 23 June, the corps units were fighting on the front of Konyukhi, Novyy Dvor, Dombrovo. Under enemy pressure by 24 June, the corps units had retreated to a front of Grodno (Folesh), Kuznitsa, Sokolka, holding the front to the west of the Grodno Highway and the Grodno—Belostok Railroad. On 24 June, upon orders from the commander of the 3d Army, the corps was to retreat to a line of the Svisloch River, but according to a proposal of the corps commander, the units remained on the front of Pogran, Giburichi, Kuznitsa-Sokolki to the end of 26 June.

In line with the rapid retreat of the units fighting to the north of the Neman River to the east of Grodno, the enemy endeavored to cross the Neman River, combing out in the rear of the corps units. But all attempts by the Germans to cross the Neman River were driven off. For checking the enemy advance, by army orders, on 26 June two motorized battalions from the 204th Mechanized Division were dropped over Lunno on a line of the Kotry River. The 1st Rifle Battalion, upon orders of the corps commander, was dropped to hold the bridge on the Lunno River.

The heavy losses suffered over the period of fighting from 22 through 26 June, both in terms of personnel as well as equipment, have made the corps with limited fighting capability. Not more than 300-400 men remain in the tank divisions and in the mechanized division there is one incomplete battalion in a regiment, up to 30 tanks and up to 20 armored vehicles. All the small rear services of the divisions were burned up or fired on by enemy aviation which literally pursued individual vehicles.

Deputy Commander for Political Affairs of the XI Corps, Reg Commissar Andreyev

TsAMO, folio 208, inv. 2526, file 28, sheets 65-72.

**POLITICAL REPORT FROM THE POLITICAL
PROPAGANDA DIRECTORATE OF THE
SOUTHWESTERN FRONT TO THE CHIEF OF
THE MAIN POLITICAL PROPAGANDA
DIRECTORATE OF THE RED ARMY**

8 July 1941

A number of units since the start of the war have been heavily engaged in fighting which has ceased neither during the day nor at night.

Regardless of the fatigue, the mood of the personnel is good.

Over the period of hostilities in a number of units and formations, there have been significant losses of material.

In the XV Rifle Corps from 22 June through 1 July, they have lost 70 trucks and 52 tractors.

In the 22d Mechanized Corps over the same time, they have lost 46 motor vehicles, 119 tanks, including 58 which were blown up by our units during the retreat due to the impossibility of repairing them on the way.

There were exceptionally great losses of the KV tanks in the 41st Tank Division. Of the 31 tanks available in the division, on 6 July 1941, just 9 remained. The enemy knocked out 5, 12 were blown up by their crews and 5 were sent for repairs.

In combat the KV tank has shown exceptionally high qualities. The enemy medium antitank artillery does not pierce its armor.

The heavy losses of KV tanks are to be explained primarily by the poor technical training of the crews, by their poor knowledge of the tank equipment as well as by the absence of spare parts. There were instances when the crews were unable to eliminate malfunctions on halted KV tanks and blew them up.

The Air Forces of the Southwestern Front from 22 June through 7 July 1941 carried out the task of destroying the enemy motor mechanized units which had broken through, they covered the rail junctions and population points, they conducted reconnaissance and covered the retreat of our troops.

According to incomplete data, over the 13 days of the war, in air combat our aviation downed over 300 enemy aircraft.

The Air Forces units of the front from 22 June through 1 July 1941 lost 354 aircraft including:

At airfields	
—(chiefly on 22 June)	—180
Downed by enemy aircraft artillery	—29
Downed in air combat	—145

In addition to this, some 225 were temporarily out of service. Some 60 percent of these aircraft have been overhauled and are participating in the fighting.

The losses in Air Forces personnel have been characterized by the following data: 309 men killed and missing in action and 165 wounded.

Each day the crews from a majority of the downed aircraft return to their units. The flight personnel, as a rule, has been maintained.

As a result of the heavy losses in the front's Air Forces, there remains a very small amount of equipment.

A total of 359 aircraft remain in service, including 169 fighters and 190 bombers. Some 209 are out of commission and undergoing repair.

Out of the total number of equipment losses in air battles, the largest has been due to the bomber aviation which has not always been escorted by fighters due to their small numbers.

The political morale of the flight and technical personnel is exceptionally high. The flight personnel has shown mass heroism in fighting against Nazi aviation.

As a consequence of the heavy equipment losses, turns have been set for the flight personnel and this has caused dissatisfaction among those who fly less in carrying out combat missions.

Chief of Political Propaganda Directorate of Southwestern Front, Brig Commissar Mikhaylov

TsAMO, folio 229, inv. 213, file 12, sheets 73-78. Original.

**SUBMISSION OF THE SOUTHWESTERN FRONT
MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 99TH RIFLE
DIVISION FOR AN AWARD OF THE ORDER OF
THE RED BANNER***

19 July 1941

The 99th Rifle Division during the period from 22 June through 12 July 1941, in conducting exceptionally intense fighting against a numerically superior enemy, has brilliantly carried out its task. Due to the heroism of the soldiers, the commanders and the political workers of the 99th Rifle Division, the town of Peremyshl has changed hands thrice and the last time the division left Peremyshl only under orders due to the retreat of the left-flank units of the 6th Army. In retreating from Peremyshl to Ostropolye, the division and its units by counterattacks several times drove off the numerically and technically superior enemy.

Regardless of the heavy losses, the division until the last day did not lose its steadfastness and heroism in fighting against the Nazi hordes. The Southwestern Front Military Council petitions for the awarding of the Order of the Red Banner to the 99th Rifle Division.

Commander of Southwestern Front, Col Gen Kirponos
Military Council Member of Southwestern Front
Khrushchev
Military Council Member of Southwestern Front, Div
Commissar Rykov
Chief of Staff of Southwestern Front, Lt Gen Purkayev

TsAMO, folio 33, inv. 682523, file 5, sheet 13. Original.

* By the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 22 July 1941, the 99th Rifle Division was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

WEHRMACHT DOCUMENTS

ORDER

Commander of Army Group
Center

Headquarters, 8 July 1941

The engagement in the Belostok—Minsk area is over. The troops of the army group fought against four Russian armies the effectives of which included around 32 rifle divisions, 8 tank divisions, 6 motor mechanized brigades and 3 cavalry divisions. Of these the following were defeated:

- 22 rifle divisions,
- 7 tank divisions,
- 6 motor mechanized brigades,
- 3 cavalry divisions.

The combat might of the remaining formations which succeeded in avoiding encirclement has also been significantly weakened. Enemy losses in personnel are very high.

The estimate of prisoners and captured equipment as of today are:

- 287,704 prisoners, including several corps and division commanders,
- 2,585 captured or destroyed tanks,
- 1,449 guns,
- 246 aircraft,
- Many small-arms, ammunition, transport, food and fuel dumps.

Our losses were not greater than those which courageous troops are willing to endure.

This major success achieved in fighting against a strong, desperately fighting enemy we owe to our belief and to your courage. To all the troops and staffs as well as to all the transport units and the worker formations in the army group, I express gratitude for the unflagging fulfillment of your duty and outstanding achievements. Our special gratitude to our comrades in arms, the Luftwaffe troops. At present, the main thing is to utilize the achieved victory! I am confident that the troops of the army group in the future will do everything within their power so that they will not rest until a final victory has been achieved!

Heil Hitler!

Gen Field Mar von Bock

TsAMO, inv. 12462, file 544, sheets 42-43. Translated from the German.

Information of High Command of the German Ground Forces

"Campaign in the East 1941"

Army Group North	Army Group Center	Army Group South
26 June. Crossing of Frontier Along Entire Front		
	24 June. Taking of Vilnius and Brest-Litovsk	
	22 June-7 July. Battle for Minsk and Belostok	
26 June. Taking of the cities of Daugavpils and Liyepaya, tank formations reach Western Dvina River		
	28 June. Reaching of Minsk	
30 June. Taking of Riga	28 June-4 July. Crossing of Berezina River	30 June. Taking of Lvov
1 July. Crossing of Western Dvina	3-5 July. Crossing of Western Dvina to north of Vitebsk	4 July. Cities of Kolomyia and Stanislav taken
		7 July. Chernovtsy taken
4-6 July. Tank formations reach old Latvian-Russian frontier, Stalin Line pierced, following taken:	3-10 July. Dnieper crossed, bridgeheads established	7 July. Dniester crossed in middle courses, Stalin Line pierced in area of Zhitomir—Berdichev
4 July—Ostrov	9 July. Minsk taken	16 July. Kishinev taken
8 July—Pskov		
11 July—Porkhov		

Information of High Command of the German Ground Forces (Continued)

"Campaign in the East 1941"

Army Group North	Army Group Center	Army Group South
14 July. Reaching of Luga. Lull in East until 14 August	16 July-5 August. Smolensk Battle	12 July. Reaching approaches to Kiev
	16 July. Smolensk taken	2-8 August. Battle at Uman
	18-21 July. Battle at Mogilev	7 August. Korosten taken
	1-8 August. Battle of Roslavl	12 August. Krivoy Rog taken
	1 August. Reaching of line to east of Smolensk and halt	12 August. Odessa surrounded
24 August. Reaching of Lovat River to south of Lake Ilmen	10-20 August. Battle of Gomet	Beginning of August—25 August. Fighting on Dnieper, forming of bridgeheads. Break in advance to East
28 August. Towns of Tallinn and Paldiski (Baltiyskiy Port) taken		20 August. Kherson taken
27 August-15 September. Repelling enemy diversionary attacks by forces of both army groups		
Surrounding of Demyansk (battle on the Pola River)		
8 September. Fortress of Shisselburg taken. Encirclement of Leningrad completed		
Lull on Eastern Front	To 1 October. Lull in East	8-19 September. Crossing of Dnieper on broad front
	12-26 September. Fighting for encirclement to the east of Kiev	
	14 September. Linking up of both panzer groups at Lohvitsa. Circle closed	
		18 September. Poltava taken
		19 September. Kiev taken
		To 30 September. Victory won on isthmus to the east of Perekop
2 October. Island of Saaremaa captured	2-9 October. Fighting at Vyazma and Bryansk	First half of October—Offensive into Donbass and the Don
	1-28 October. Offensive against Tula	8 October. Mariupol taken
	2 October. Orel taken	16 October. Odessa taken
		18 October. Taganrog taken
		24 October. Kharkov taken
20 October. Kiyumaa Island captured	10-30 October. Offensive of 4th Army on Moscow	
	24 October. Kaluga taken	
	14 October. Kalinin taken	
19 October-9 November. Offensive via Chudovo to northeast	1-25 November. Offensive on Ryazan axis, bypassing Tula	Beginning of November. Continuation of offensive operations in Crimea and the Don
9 November. Tikhvin taken		1 November. Simferopol taken
		16 November. Kerch taken
		20-21 November. Rostov taken

End of Hitler Germany

904P0003C VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 9, Sep 89 (signed to press 9 Sep 89)
pp 22-32

[Archival material prepared by Col (Ret) Ya.M. Gorelik, candidate of military sciences: "The End of Nazi Germany"; correct spelling of German names verified where possible]

[Text] [Introduction] With such a title soon after the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, we, three Soviet Army officers, decided to prepare a collection of documents and materials.¹ The talks with the publishing houses went on for a long time on publishing such a collection. However, the collecting of the documents and materials commenced. We had agreed that in preparing the collection, it was essential to select materials relating chiefly to 1945, the last year of the war. Here would be shown the desperate attempts by the bankrupt Nazi leaders, particularly in the spring of 1945, to change the course of events and avoid a final defeat in the war. The collected documents were to deal with the last days of Hitler's Reich and to a proper degree reflect the events related to the surrender of Nazi Germany. Here we gave priority significance to the documents relating to the last days of April and the first days of May 1945 which eloquently showed the collapse of Hitler's Headquarters and the complete impotence of the ruling circles of the Nazi upper clique to find a way out of the stalemate into which they had led the nation.

These documents, as we hoped, could show how the Nazi Command again and again urged that the last effort be made to save the Fuhrer's position. Hitler with the tenacity of a maniac continued to believe that it was possible to halt the victorious offensive of the Soviet Army and turn back the course of history. In committing hundreds of thousands of soldiers to certain death, the Nazi generals and Hitler himself did not want to realize that the war had been lost completely and further resistance would merely increase the number of victims.

At the same time, we sought out for incorporating in the collection documents and materials which would show that the Nazi Command concealed from the troops the actual situation which arose with the successful Soviet army offensive. The ruling circles of Nazi Germany also endeavored to sow discord between the nations participating in the anti-Hitler coalition and conclude a separate truce with England and the United States.

In addition, we tried to find and include in the collection documents which could repudiate the erroneous versions or direct falsifications by certain bourgeois historians and memoirists that Hitler's successor, Grand Adm Donitz, and the people around him endeavored to begin the break of Germany with Naziism.

In being guided by these criteria, we set to work in preparing to publish a collection of documents and materials entitled "Konets gitlerovskoy Germanii" [The

End of Nazi Germany]. Several years were spent on assembling and discussing the documents to be incorporated in the collection. For selecting documents Doctor of Historical Sciences, Lt Col N.I. Salekhov, went to the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense [TsAMO], the author of these lines went to the Central State Archives of the October Revolution [TsGAOR] where are kept the archives of TASS and Sovinformburo [Soviet Information Buro] and, finally, Col V.I. Nemchinov was to review and translate the existing documents in foreign languages.

In addition, I was instructed to get in touch with officers from the Intelligence Departments of the First Belorussian Front, Col A.I. Smyslov, and the Baltic Fleet Staff, N.S. Frumkin, who, upon assignment of the Soviet Military Administration, traveled to Bad Mandorf [American Occupation Zone], where they interrogated the main military criminals of Nazi Germany in 1945. They brought back the records of the interrogations of such leaders of Nazi Germany as the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Reichsmarshal Hermann Goring, the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), Gen Field Mar Wilhelm Keitel, the Chief of Staff for Operations Leadership of the OKW, Col Gen Alfred Jodl, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Karl Donitz, the actual successor to power after the suicide of Hitler, the former Chief of the Operations Department of the OKW Staff, Gen Art Walter Warlimont, the Chief of the Operations Department of the Navy High Staff, Rear Adm Wagner and others.

The intensive work by the group of officers involved as compilers of the collection "Konets gitlerovskoy Germanii" was drawing to an end. Significantly more documents had been assembled than had been set by the amount designated by the publishing house. Thus, over 200 documents with varying content from the TsAMO and TsGAOR remained unused.

Here it was decided to publish with cuts the verbatim interrogations of the prisoner-of-war Nazi leaders brought from Bad Mandorf as well as the documents which were published in the journal VOPROSY ISTORII, No 6, 1965, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Having studied the assembled documents and materials and having prepared a scientific structure for them following all the rules of archeography, we submitted them with a small foreword to Izdatelstvo Nauka. The material was accepted and incorporated in the publishing house's subject plan for 1966. However, Doctor of Historical Sciences D.A. Kavlenko and Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Col D.M. Proektor, having given a positive assessment, proposed we somewhat broaden the framework of the documentary collection with materials from the theses of Walter Ulbricht on the essence of German Naziism, include materials from the Manifesto of the National Free Germany Committee to the German Army and People of 21 June 1943, and add to chapters to the collection: "Soviet Military

Leaders and Generals on the Last Days of Hitler Germany" and "Aid to the German People, Particularly the Population of Berlin and Dresden, After the Surrender of the Nazi Army."

After further work following the comments of the reviewers, the collection "Konets gitterovskoy Germanii" was set for printing. The author group was involved in reading the proofs and selecting additional illustrations. However, the publishing of the work was stopped by the Military History Institute. The chief of this institute, Lt Gen P.A. Zhilin, wanted the plates to be broken up since supposedly after completing the publication of the 12-volume "History of World War II of 1939-1945," the institute itself would publish several volumes of documents and materials. However, this did not happen. Our collection was not published nor did they publish the collections of documents and materials of the Military History Institute.

The selection of documents and materials published below from the unpublished collection "Konets gitterovskoy Germanii" consists of the documents turned over for incorporation in this collection by the Department Chief of the Staff of the First Belorussian Front, now deceased, Col A.M. Smyslov² soon after the end of the war.

All of these documents relate to the last days of Hitler Germany. Being concrete historical material, they show that the German militarists together with Hitler and other Nazi leaders, bore responsibility for all the crimes committed against mankind. They reproduce the picture of the collapse of Hitler Germany, they show certain details of the last days of its existence and they serve as vivid proof of the crimes of Nazism against its own people and which led to the senseless losses before the complete collapse of Nazi Germany.

Footnotes

1. Lt Col N.I. Salekhov, doctor of historical sciences; Col Ya.M. Gorelik, candidate of military sciences; political worker Col V.I. Nemchinov who during the war years worked in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army.

2. Col Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Smyslov (1904-1970) was a former officer from the intelligence department of the Staff of the First Belorussian Front. He was born in Astrakhan. He completed the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze. In 1945, he participated in the group of Soviet officers in interrogating the main military criminals in Bad Mandorf. Not long before his death, A.M. Smyslov turned over certain documents which he had kept for publishing in the collection of documents and materials "Konets gitterovskoy Germanii." [End of Introduction]

File No 75

Of Testimony of Prisoner-of-War Gruppenfuhrer (Lt Gen) SS and Police Troops and Chief of the Imperial

Teams of the Personal Guard of Hitler and the Other Nazi Leaders [Hans Rathenguber] Captured in the City of Berlin

Hans Rathenguber, born 1897, in Oberachen (the Munich area), with a secondary education, joined the army in 1916 and after the war served in the public order police in Bavaria. In 1936, he was given the rank of Standartenfuhrer (Col) and in 1944, Brigadefuhrer (Maj Gen) and in February of the same year, Gruppenfuhrer (Lt Gen) of the SS troops and the police.

The prisoner of war stated: ...In 1933, I began organizing personal security teams for Hitler, Goring, Gobbels, Himmler and others. By 1945, I had organized and had under my command the following imperial personal security teams:

1. The personal security teams of Hitler: a) in Berlin consisting of 35 men and headed by the Obersturmbannfuhrer (Lt Col) Eigel; b) in Obersalzberg consisting of 46 men and headed by the Obersturmfuhrer (Sr Lt) Zenger.
2. The personal security team of Goring consisting of 22 men and headed by Hauptsturmfuhrer (Capt) Heinicke.
3. The security team for von Ribbentrop consisting of 22 men and headed by the Hauptsturmfuhrer (Capt) Witman.
4. The security team for Himmler consisting of 24 men and headed by Sturmbannfuhrer (Maj) Kiermeyer.
5. The security team of Gobbels consisting of 12 men and headed by Hauptsturmfuhrer (Capt) Eckholt.
6. The security team for Frick consisting of 11 men and headed by Obersturmfuhrer (Sr Lt) Gilhuber.
7. The security team for Frank consisting of 14 men and headed by Obersturmfuhrer (Sr Lt) Schlichtel.
8. The security team for Seyss-Inquart consisting of 10 men and headed by Sturmbannfuhrer (Maj) Wandorfer.
9. The security team for Tierbofen consisting of 6 men and headed by Obersturmfuhrer (Sr Lt) Bartel.
10. The security team for Donitz consisting of 6 men and headed by Untersturmfuhrer (Lt) Berger.
11. The teams Munchen and Berchtesgaden consisting of 16 men and headed by Sturmbannfuhrer (Maj) Schmidbauer.
12. The teams Munchen and Berchtesgaden had as their task protecting the residences of Hitler and the other Nazi leaders located in Munich and Berchtesgaden.

I was personally subordinate to Hitler. Under me was a small staff consisting of the following co-workers:

a) A chief of staff and simultaneously reviewer for personnel affairs and under him were two assistants for personnel affairs, the first concerned with the questions

of the officer personnel and the second with the junior officer and rank-and-file personnel;

b) Review offices for information and expert evaluation and these received all data from the Gestapo on the conspiracies against the persons guarded by my teams and this review office was also concerned with the questions of checking on the personnel of the personal servants of the individuals guarded by us;

c) Review office III which was concerned with administrative and financial questions;

d) Review office IV which was concerned with the questions of the training and preparation of the team personnel.

The chief of staff was Sturnbannfuhrer (Maj) Kiesel and his first associate for personnel matters was Obersturmfuhrer (Sr Lt) Scholz and the second associate Obersturmfuhrer (Sr Lt) Schmidt.

The reviewer II was Sturnbannfuhrer (Maj) Heisl and he was simultaneously the reviewer IV (reviewer for training and preparation).

Reviewer III was Sturnbannfuhrer (Maj) Weber and under him were Hauptsturmbuhrer (Capt) Noak and Obersturmfuhrer (Sr Lt) Embaufeld as well as feldfebls Berger, Hofbauer and Lt Heine.

The personal security teams were obliged to accompany the persons they protected on all their trips. As a rule, I was to know where the persons guarded by my teams were to travel but I was not to inform anyone of their place of residence except Hitler.

In terms of Hitler's trips, I was categorically prohibited by Hitler personally from telling anyone, even his closest associates. There was an instance when Himmler arrived and, not finding Hitler there, stated to me: "I know that you must not say where the Fuhrer is. In order not to cause a conflict with your conscience, I will not ask you about this" and left.

As for the last events, I know the following: after the Russian troops had broken through the German defenses on the Oder, Hitler in the presence of Gobbels and Bormann (I was in another room) stated: "If it were a matter of talks, then one could permit talks only with Russia but not with England. However, I cannot do this."

When there was a direct threat of the encirclement of Berlin by the Russian troops, Keitel, Col Gen Jodl and others insisted that Hitler leave Berlin and to this he replied: "If I leave, Berlin will fall immediately, if the city holds out for a little bit but is surrounded, the troops will not come to its aid if I am not here..." Here Hitler placed great hopes on the Wenck army which was to arrive from the south and on the Steiner group which was to be organized in the north.

When the threat arose to Berlin, Ribbentrop and Goring left Berlin for the south while the Ribbentrop family was in Fuschl (20 km to the southeast of Salzburg).

I had heard that relations between Hitler and Goring during the last days had deteriorated very sharply, since Goring supposedly demanded that Hitler turn over to him the leadership of Germany.

Himmler visited Hitler for the last time on 19 or 20 April and then he flew off. A couple of days later, I was present at the following scene: Hitler was given the last typed messages from the London Radio where it was announced that Himmler had proposed Germany's unconditional surrender to England and the United States. Several minutes before this, Bormann and Gobbels had persuaded Hitler to fly out of Berlin. Having read the radio message, Hitler crumpled the sheet of paper and stated: "I am not going anywhere, they have all betrayed me."

At 1930 hours on 29 April, I was with Hitler for the last time and present in addition to Hitler and Mme Braun (whom Hitler had married on 28 April) were Dr Gobbels, Gen Burkdorf, Gen Krebs and Bormann. Hitler stated to me: "I thank you for the service and I will not be here tomorrow."

On 30 April in the second half of the day, Sturmbannfuhrer (Maj) Linge, Hitler's personal bodyguard, told me that Hitler and his wife had taken their lives in suicide, that he had wrapped his body in a blanket and according to his will had burned it in the courtyard of the Imperial Chancellory.

On 30 April in the evening Gobbels stated: "With the existing situation there is only one thing remaining for me to do and that is to turn to the Russians" and he sent Gen Krebs with proposals to the Russian Command.

At 2030 hours on 1 May, Gobbels said farewell to me, having stated that he had nowhere to go. Gen Burkdorf stated that Gobbels and his family ended their lives in suicide.

After the defeat of the German troops in Upper Silesia, the Chief of the General Staff, Col Gen Guderian, fell gravely ill (a major nervous collapse) and left for Bad Ebenhausen (Upper Bavaria).

Hitler's personal senior aide, Obergruppenfuhrer SS Staub, on 20 April left for Munich with a special assignment from Hitler. I assume that he was to destroy Hitler's secret papers.

The chief of the Gest. po 4th Department (Counterintelligence), Gruppenfuhrer Muller came to us on 1 May and stated that he would commit suicide.

The chief of the Gestapo 6th Department ((Intelligence), Brigadefuhrer Schellenberg I saw the last time in Berlin at the beginning of April.

After 20 July 1944 (the assassination attempt against Hitler), access to Hitler was extraordinarily limited. The only ones to be able to see him were: Himmler, Gobbels, Goring, Keitel, Col Gen Jodl, the chief of the Operations Directorate of the Staff of the Armed Forces, Guderian, Donitz, Speer (minister of military production) and Hitler's aides.

After 20 July 1944, Hitler could not stand the sight of a briefcase and Himmler, Goring and Gobbels, in going to report to Hitler, for this reason took aides with them who carried the briefcases into the reception room and from them Himmler, Goring and Gobbels removed the papers and entered into Hitler's office.

Keitel, Jodl and Guderian took along aides who were subject to search, they inspected also the briefcases of Field Mar Keitel and Col Gens Jodl and Guderian and the aides with them.

At the beginning of 1945, Hitler received Gen Man-teuffel and before the general could enter Hitler's office, he was thoroughly searched.

At the beginning of April 1945, Hitler received a report from the commander of the 9th Army, Gen Busse, who was also subjected to this procedure.

On 16-17 April 1945, I received data from the Gestapo on attacks being prepared against Hitler and Himmler on 20 April (Hitler's birthday) and the source of these data was Spanish. I checked with Burkdorf whether Hitler intended on 20 April to go out or receive visitors and having received a negative answer, I limited myself to personally standing guard all day in Hitler's reception office. I informed no one of the received data, including Hitler. Himmler was far away and I did not undertake any precautionary measures. [End of Testimony]

Interrogators:

Chief of Investigatory Unit of Intelligence Department
of Staff of First Belorussian Front, Lt Col Savitskiy
Capt Surkis

Interrogation conducted on 9 May 1945.

File No 74

Of Evidence of Hitler's Chief Pilot and Commander of the Government Air Detachment, Gruppenfuhrer (Lt Gen) SS Troops Hans Bauer, Taken Prisoner on 2 May 1945 in Berlin

Hans Bauer, born 1897 in Hanfing (Bavaria), secondary education, from 1920 member of the National Socialist Party. From 1914 through 1920, he served in the German Army and after the war until 1933, worked as a pilot in the German Civil Air Fleet. In 1934, he was transferred to the SS Troops, and was given the rank of Standartenfuhrer (Col). In 1944, he became a Brigadefuhrer (Maj Gen) of the SS Troops and in February 1945, received the rank of Gruppenfuhrer (Lt Gen) of the SS Troops.

The prisoner of war stated: ...I became acquainted with Hitler in 1932, during an election campaign and during this election campaign I provided him with exceptional services, being one of the best pilots in the German Civil Fleet (by this time I had flown 2 million km), I during each evening flew Hitler in his own aircraft to five or six places which were hundreds of kilometers apart, where he spoke at meetings.

After Hitler had come to power, he proposed that I be transferred to him as a chief pilot and then I was instructed to assemble a group of the best pilots in the nation and organize a governmental detachment from them. This I did.

At the last, the governmental air detachment had approximately up to 30 aircraft, including the FW-200, Ju-52 and Fieseler-Storch. The most outstanding pilots of this detachment were: Maj Gundelfinger, Capt Hubner, Maj Lissau, Maj Hauman, Col Beitz, Sr Lt Geisenhart, Capt Grauthof, Sr Lt Schultze, Ober Staff Engr Funk, Capt Schmidt, Maj Henke, Maj Adam, Capt Hislein, Capt Strietmater and Capt Schrader.

The government air detachment was assigned for the trips of Hitler and the leading ministers. For example, I flew with Hitler to the meeting with Mussolini, in 1939, I flew Ribbentrop to Moscow and so forth.

The government detachment was also used for delivering urgent orders and emergency freight to surrounded German troop groupings and so forth.

Recently, in line with the intensified bombings of Berlin by the Anglo-American aviation, and in particular the Berlin airfields, the aircraft of the government detachment have been dispersed and were at the airfields of Salzburg, Wittstok, Schenewalde, Funsterwalde (100 km to the south of Berlin).

Hitler flew out of Berlin on 22-23 April to Obersalzberg (the Munich area).

On 24 April, I proposed to Hitler that he fly out of Berlin, but he categorically refused and I know that both Gobbels, Gormann and others proposed that Hitler fly out of Berlin but he constantly refused. On 29 or 30 April, even if he had wished to fly out, there was no longer such a possibility, as there were no open areas where an aircraft could land for him and from whence he could take off.

Up to 27 or 28 April, we used a small landing strip on Unter den Linden near the Zoo. On 27 or 28 April, I landed my Ju-52 here for the last time, the Russians discovered this and blew up this landing strip with artillery and rockets.

During the last days Hitler looked very bad, he appeared extremely tired and exceptionally ill, and he seemed 10 years older than he had been the year before.

During the day of 1 May, I said farewell to Gobbels and here he told me that he would remain in Berlin, his words were: "I will go to the bottom together with the city."

I assume that near Hitler until the last minute was his personal servant, Sturmbannfuhrer (Maj) Linge who together with Bormann and others left with a detachment which endeavored to break out of Berlin.... [End of Testimony]

Interrogation conducted by:

Chief of Investigatory Unit of Intelligence Department
of Staff of First Belorussian Front, Lt Col Savitskiy
Capt Surkis

Interrogation conducted on 7 May 1945.

Verbatim Record of Interrogation No 1/5

Of Prisoner of War Vice Adm Foss Taken Prisoner on 2 May 1945 in Berlin

For the last two years, I was the personal representative of the Navy Commander, Grand Adm Donitz, at Hitler's Headquarters.

I had the exceptional confidence of both Hitler himself as well as Grand Adm Donitz.

From approximately 10 April 1945, I was continuously at the Imperial Chancellory together with Hitler, Gobbels and their closest associates. I should say that Hitler did not summon me to Berlin, I was there at my own initiative and requested permission to remain with the Fuhrer.

Hitler was personally directing the defense of Berlin. His closest assistants were Gobbels, Bormann and the new Chief of the General Staff, Gen Krebs.

Hitler's relations with Goring and Himmler during the last were extremely tense.

Goring even in March 1945 had been removed from the command of the Luftwaffe, he had been replaced by Gen Ritter von Greim and, as far as I knew, had left for his estate in Salzburg. His retirement was justified by the fact that German aviation had not carried out the tasks assigned to it and could not provide any decisive influence on the course of the fighting on the Western and Eastern Fronts nor defend the German cities against devastating bombing by Allied aviation.

Hitler could not forgive Himmler for the defeat on the Vistula. After Himmler had been removed from the command of Army Group Vistula, relations between them became extremely tense. In conversations with me the Fuhrer reacted very sharply about Himmler. The latter long before the start of the fighting for Berlin was not in the capital. His headquarters recently were located in Lubeck.

The attempts undertaken by Himmler at the end of April 1945 to hold talks with England and the United States

were made by him without the knowledge of Hitler. Moreover, having learned of this, the latter called Himmler a traitor.

Recently, Hitler has repeatedly raised the question of what would be the best outcome for Europe: an orientation to England and America or to Russia. Here he described Mar Stalin as the strongest, most consistent and strong-willed of his enemies and who would not make any compromises. The Fuhrer frequently voiced this opinion in conversations with me.

Grand Adm Donitz who was out of Berlin was not kept informed of these changes in Hitler's views, as over the last two weeks there had been no contact with him. In truth, attempts had been made to establish contact with him through liaison officers but these were not crowned with success. At 1430 hours on 30 April 1945, Hitler called me in and spoke with me for around 10 minutes. He instructed me personally to pass on to Grand Adm Donitz his last testament stemming from the above-indicated changes in his views.

I can also say that this was of very great significance for the future of both Germany and Russia.

In terms of its nature, this message was not so much military as it was of a political or even diplomatic nature.

The fact that the Fuhrer gave this assignment to precisely me can be explained by my particular closeness and loyalty to both him and to Grand Adm Donitz. The latter, as a sailor, up to the present in political terms was oriented to the West and the Fuhrer's testament which was unknown to him, had it been passed on by any other person, would have been considered a forgery or a provocation.

Then Hitler stated that he would remain at his post to the end and said farewell to me. Although he did not directly state his intention to take his own life, this stemmed both from his previous statements and from this conversation.

Approximately an hour after our conversation, that is, at around 1530 hours on 30 April 1945, Hitler took his own life.

I learned of this from his SS aide in the words of whom the Fuhrer and his wife (three days before his death, Hitler had married his mistress with whom he had lived for a long time) poisoned themselves with prussic acid and after which they shot themselves.

I personally saw Hitler's body wrapped in a carpet being carried out of his office. Then according to the words of the aide, the bodies of the Fuhrer and his wife were burned and the ashes buried in the garden of the Imperial Chancellory.

Before his death, the Fuhrer entrusted the duties of Reichspresident to Grand Adm Donitz, Reichschancellor to Dr Gobbels and the imperial leader of the

National Socialist Party to Bormann and minister of foreign affairs to Seyss-Inquart.

In the evening of 30 April, Gobbels and Bormann decided to enter into talks with the Soviet Command. This mission was voluntarily assumed by the Chief of the General Staff, Gen Krebs, who in the past had been military attache in Moscow for several years.

He left for the positions of the Russian troops where the talks were held, but returned without results.

On 1 May 1945, the area of the Imperial Chancellory became an immediate scene of combat.

In this situation a decision was taken to break out of Berlin to the north.

At around 1800 hours on 1 May 1945, I spoke with Gobbels who stated that he would not participate in the attempts to break out and would remain until the end in the Imperial Chancellory.

Between 2000 and 2100 hours on 1 May 1945, we attempted to break out of the Imperial Chancellory. Participating in this attempt was a group numbering up to 500 persons and consisting of the subunits defending the Imperial Chancellory. In this group, in addition to myself, were Bormann, the Commander of the Fuhrer's Squadron, Lt Gen Bauer, Hitler's SS aide, the three female secretaries of Hitler and, as far as I recall, the chief of the General Staff, Gen Krebs. The group had the task of breaking out to the north and linking up with the German troops operating there. We did not know precisely where these troops were since as a consequence of the absence of contact, the front line was unclear. I myself endeavored to make my way to Grand Adm Donitz but the precise location of the latter was also not known to me. In order to more successfully carry out my mission, I had changed into civilian clothing, leaving my admiral's uniform in the Imperial Chancellory.

I do not know whether Gobbels was still alive by the moment of the start of the break-out or not, as I never saw him again after the above-mentioned conversation.

After our departure, only a company of sailors remained in the Imperial Chancellory as its last guard.

Our group did not move in a compact mass but rather using the subway tunnels, houses and so forth for camouflage, it quickly spread out. In one of the houses I encountered the German civilian population which sent me to a house across the street where supposedly the German police was located. When I made my way there, it turned out that there were Russians in this building and I was taken prisoner by them.

On 3 May 1945, I was shown for identification purposes the charred bodies of a man and a woman as well as the bodies of six children (a little boy and five girls) with the indications of poisoning.

In them I recognized the bodies of Dr Gobbels, his wife and children.

I recognized Gobbels' body from the shape of the head, the line of the mouth, the prosthesis on the right foot and the remnants of the yellow shape of the National Socialist Party, the gold party insignia.

The body of his wife I recognized from her size, the gold party insignia (several days before his death, Hitler had presented her with his own insignia) and which very few women in Germany had as well as from the cigarette case with the monogram "Adolf Hitler" and the date "29 October 34" on the inside of the lid. This cigarette case had been given by Hitler to Gobbels or to his wife on a birthday (they had the same birthday, the date of which also was found on the case) and Gobbels' wife had used this for the last 3 weeks. The bodies of the children I recognized as the daughters and son of Gobbels whom I had known well, as they had repeatedly stayed with me.

At the same time, I was shown the body of a man with the traces of a gun wound on the right temple and from the facial features, the semibald head as well as from the name "Krebs" sewn in on the inside of the jacket I recognized the Chief of the General Staff, Gen Krebs.

I should say that up to this moment I had not known anything about the suicide or death of Krebs. On the contrary, as far as I recalled, Krebs was among those who in the evening of 1 May 1945 had tried to break out of the Imperial Chancellory. But at the very outset I had lost sight of him.

On 3 May 1945, escorted by Russian officers, I was delivered to the Imperial Chancellory. Several-score meters from the Chancellory building lay up to 20 bodies and one of these (a man's body in a black civilian suit) I recognized as Hitler's cook. Next to him lay the body of his wife.

Hitler's cook was very similar to the Fuhrer himself and for this reason at first it even seemed to me that this was the body of Hitler himself, but with careful inspection I was certain of my error.

Chief of Investigative Unit of Intelligence Department
of Staff of Third Ukrainian Front,
Capt Alperovich

Verbatim Record of Interrogation No 38

Of Prisoner of War, Commander of the Rear Security Troops of the 9th Army, Lt Gen Friedrich Berngard, Taken Prisoner on 29 April 1945 in the Area of Neuendorf (to the Northwest of Beeskow)

Friedrich Berngard, born 1883 in Bad Harzburg to a landowner family, completed gymnasium, married, German, not a member of the party. In the army since 1909.

Question: Please describe briefly your career in the army.

Answer: I joined the army in 1909, and completed military school in Metz. In August 1910, I was given the rank of lieutenant, in 1915, senior lieutenant, in 1917, captain. In 1917, I was captured by the Russians on the Eastern Front and here I remained until 1920, first in Krasnoyarsk and later in Kansk. After return from captivity, I again entered the army and served in the signal troops. In 1930, I received the rank of major, in 1932, lieutenant colonel and in 1935, colonel.

From 1932 until 1935, I was in command of a signals battalion, and from 1935 through 1939, the commander of a signals regiment in the II Corps stationed in Stettin.

In 1940, I received the rank of major general and in 1942, lieutenant general.

From 1939, I was the signals chief of the 7th Army and in the war in France, I was the signals chief of the 18th Army. From the second half of 1940 through 1942, I was the signals chief of the army group of Gen Field Mar Rundstedt, at first in the West and then in the East.

From April 1942, I was appointed the commander of the rear security troops at first for the 2d Panzer Army and then the 9th Army and up to the moment of my capture, I held the given post.

I have a number of decorations, including the German Cross in Gold.

Question: Indicate the front of operations of the 9th Army and the effectives of the 9th Army by mid-April 1945.

Answer: By the beginning of April 1945, the northern frontier of the 9th Army ran along the line of Bad Freienwalde; the southern line ran along the southern extremity of Lake Schwieloch-See (20 km to the south of Beeskow).

By this time, the effectives of the 9th Army included:

- a) The CI Army Corps on the northern flank of the army;
- b) The XI Panzer Corps SS at the center of the army;
- c) The III Mountain Rifle Corps SS on the southern flank of the army.

In the reserve of the 9th Army was the corps headquarters of the XXXIX Panzer Corps.

On the first days of April, the northern flank of the 9th Army was moved to the north and ran along the line of the Hohenzollern Canal; the southern boundary of the 9th Army remained unchanged. Not long before the start of the Soviet troop offensive of 13-14 April, the CI Army Corps was taken away from the 9th Army and transferred to the 3d Panzer Army. The northern boundary of the 9th Army was moved south and ran approximately in the area of Werneuche.

At the same time, the 9th Army had subordinate to it the right-flank corps of the 4th Panzer Army, the V Army Corps.

During the days of 13-14 April, the headquarters of the XXXIX Panzer Corps which was in the reserve of the 9th Army was removed from the 9th Army and its place was taken by the headquarters of the LVI Panzer Corps which up to the start of the Russian offensive was located in Wald Sifersdorf (to the northwest of Muencheberg).

It was assumed that the headquarters of this corps would bring together the divisions in the reserve of the 9th Army and would be committed to combat, if circumstances required this.

By mid-April 1945, by the moment of the start of the Soviet army offensive from the bridgeheads on the Oder, the 9th Army had up to 15 divisions on the front, including the units which were in the corps reserves.

By this time there were four divisions in the reserve of the 9th Army.

I do not possess accurate data on the numerical strength of the 9th Army by the start of the Russian offensive, but I would assume that it numbered up to 100,000 fighting men and I do not include in this figure the Volkssturm subunits.

Question: What data did the German Command possess on the Russian troop offensive being prepared, what countermeasures did the German Command take and what were the orders of the Higher Command of the German Army?

Answer: I can state categorically that our Command possessed completely accurate data on the forthcoming major offensive by the Russian troops on the Berlin axis. In particular, on 5 or 6 April, the commander of the 9th Army, Gen Inf Nusse, called a meeting which was attended by the corps commanders, myself, the chief of staff and the service chiefs of the 9th Army.

The chief of the Intelligence Department of the 9th Army, a lieutenant colonel (I have forgotten his name), gave a report on the situation and the enemy opposing the 9th Army. The chief of the army Intelligence Department pointed out that we were opposed by the troops of Mar Zhukov, that two tank armies had arrived here after completing the operation in Eastern Pomerania and that the Russians possessed a 10-fold superiority in tanks and artillery and a 5-fold one in infantry.

The Chief of the Operations Department of the Army Staff, the General Staff Lt Col Eife made a statement that the blocking zone of the 9th Army running generally along the line of Eberswalde—Strausberg—Muencheberg—Lake Schermuzel See—Lake Schwieloch See was basically occupied by combat engineer units, Volkssturm subunits and this was a completely insignificant force. He also pointed out that upon Hitler's orders, all the reserve units located in Berlin were to occupy this blocking zone and this same blocking zone

would have an antitank brigade of the Hitlerjugend numbering up to 2,000 men.

Also speaking at the same conference was the army commander, Gen Busse, who stated that there is an order from the Supreme Command according to which the front should be held under all circumstances and that regardless of everything, the 9th Army should defend Berlin and fight even if the Americans shoot us in the back.

The basic measures of the German Command in anticipation of the Russian offensive came down to the following:

1. A deeply echeloned defense was built along the entire army front, and these defensive structures stretched into the blocking zone of the 9th Army and on the line of the blocking zone all population points were to be turned into strongpoints. The field fortifications of the blocking zone were to stretch to the external defensive perimeter of Berlin, that is, defensive lines were built to the entire depth from the Oder River to Berlin.

2. The Command of the 9th Army basically filled out the divisions which were in the first line and four divisions which were in the reserve as an assault fist.

3. An enormous number of Volkssturm battalions was organized in Berlin and the Berlin area.

Question: What German Army formations were surrounded, who of the leadership of the 9th Army was encircled, and what were the orders of the German Command?

Answer: In the encirclement were the vestiges of the divisions of the XI Panzer Corps SS, the VI Mountain Rifle Corps SS, the V Army Corps, the Volkssturm units as well as various rear subunits.

I estimate that in the encirclement were up to 50,000 fighting men and up to 10,000 Volkssturm members. Together with the rear services, I feel that there were up to 150,000 men in the encirclement.

Also in the encirclement were all the commanders of the 9th Army, including Gen Inf Busse, workers of the 9th Army Staff, the commanders and staffs of the XI Panzer Corps SS, the VI Mountain Rifle Corps SS and the V Army Corps as well as the senior and higher officers of the army rear facilities.

The order of the Higher German Command stated: hold out to the last man. Under all circumstances hold the occupied lines and do not attempt to break through. Help by aircraft was promised but in fact it turned out that our command was unable to supply the surrounded troops with the aid of aircraft.

On 28 April, the army commander, Gen Inf Busse, infuriated, sent off a radiogram which stated: "You have clearly already written off the 9th Army..." and ordered the troops to break through.

The German units were to break through to the west in three groups and the breakthrough was to be executed in the evening of 28 April. The path was to be broken by the remnants of the panzer subunits of the 9th Army and the commander, Gen Busse, traveled with them. The breakthrough did not succeed. The main reason causing Gen Busse to take the decision for the breakthrough was clearly the lack of ammunition, since by 28 April we had enough ammunition for 2 days and there were no hopes of obtaining this by air.

Question: List the command personnel you know of the Army Group, the 9th Army and the formations of the 9th Army.

Answer: The 9th Army was part of the Army Group Vistula which until the second half of March 1945 was under the command of Himmler while in the second half of March, he was replaced by Col Gen Heinritzi. The chief of the Operations Department of Army Group Vistula was Col Eisman. The commander of the 9th Army is Gen Inf Busse. The chief of staff of the 9th Army is Maj Gen Yelts. The Chief of the Rear Services of the 9th Army is the General Staff Col Schwambek. The commander of the LVI Panzer Corps is Gen Art Weidping. The commander of the V Army Corps is Gen Art Weger. The commander of the V Mountain Rifle Corps SS is Jokoln. The commander of the XI Panzer Corps SS is Obergruppenfuhrer Klein-Heisterkampz.

Question: Give the location of the staff of the 9th Army.

Answer: Before the beginning of April, the 9th Army Staff was located in Furstenwalde. On 1-3 April, it moved to Bad Serow (to the south of Furstenwalde).

Its last location was in the area of Hermsdorf (to the north—northeast of Wendisch-Buhholz).

Question: What do you see as the main reasons for the defeats of the German Army and Germany in the current war?

Answer: I consider the main reasons for the defeats of the German armies both in individual operations and in the entire war to be the following:

1. The colossal material superiority, in particular, and this was felt in the last operations, the Russians concentrated enormous masses of artillery, while we felt an acute shortage of artillery, the Russians committed thousands of tanks to battle, so, for example, we were told that in the winter offensive by the Russian troops up to 9,000 armored units participated from the bridgeheads on the Vistula while we did not possess either a sufficient number of tanks nor the necessary fuel for them.

2. The nightmare of three fronts, our strategy was clearly incapable of dealing with this nightmare.

3. The actions of the Anglo-American aviation which to a significant degree underlined the material base of our armies, in Germany scores of major industrial centers were destroyed and there were hundreds of thousands of

killed in the civilian population. I have been told that during a single night at the end of January or in the beginning of February in Dresden, 100,000 persons perished as a result of a single bombing raid. This was the heaviest raid by Anglo-American aviation on Germany during the entire 6 years of the war.

4. The failure of the German leadership system where the army commanders and even the commanders of army groups actually did not lead the troops but were in a position of blind executors of the will of Headquarters.

An army commander could not turn a battalion without permission from Headquarters.

I personally feel that one of the main reasons for the loss of the 9th Army was Hitler's order to hold out, to hold out to the last man. When the threat arose that the Russian troops would envelop the 9th Army on the flanks and reach its rear, the army commander constantly proposed that the army be pulled back to the line of Oranienburg—Konigs—Wusterhausen and defend on the fortified positions of Berlin.

The commander of Army Group Vistula, Col Gen Heintz, approved and supported this plan while Hitler ordered no retreat and the holding of the occupied lines at any price.

5. The masterful, skilled and very fluid leadership of the Russian armies. On the given question I want to point out the unusual art of the Russians in discovering weak points in our defenses and choosing the axes of the main thrusts and in the given instance, it seems to me, this is an accomplishment of the Russian intelligence service.

Question: What was the mood of the German generals and officers before the start of the Soviet troop offensive (16 April 1945) and after the encirclement of the 9th Army by the Soviet troops?

Answer: After the Russian troops had reached the Oder River and after the defeats of our armies in the West, our illusions were shattered. A predominant majority of the generals and the officer corps understood all the seriousness of Germany's position.

Moreover, the seriousness of this position was also recognized by the leaders of our government.

In April 1945, at the staff of the 9th Army a meeting was held which was attended by the army commander, the leading workers of the army staff, the commanders and chiefs of staff of the corps.

Speaking at the meeting was the high official from the propaganda ministry Nauman giving a report on the situation. He stated approximately the following: the military situation of Germany is exceptionally critical and from the military viewpoint we cannot win the war but the 9th Army should still hold the front under all circumstances and by the holding of Berlin provide a beneficial effect on the political situation which can give Germany certain chances.

I feel that a majority of the officers recognized the absolute senselessness of further fighting and during the last 2 or 3 days it has been repeatedly said to me by army staff officers (Maj Gen Spengnaer and the commandant of the Field Commandant Office of Strausberg Bezirk) and others that it is incomprehensible why the 9th Army doesn't surrender.

I think that one of the main reasons for the tenacity of our units is the fear of Russian captivity, since over the last few years we have been convinced that the "Russians shoot all prisoners of war." [End of Interrogation]

Interrogation conducted by:

Chief of Investigatory Unit of Intelligence Department
of Staff of First Belorussian Front,
Lt Col Savitskiy
Capt Surkis

Interrogation conducted on 30 April 1945.

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IN THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH

Price of Aggression

904P0003D VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 9, Sep 89 (signed to press 9 Sep 89)
pp 33-41

[Article by Maj Gen V.V. Gurkin and Col O.G. Gurov:
"The Price of Aggression (Killed and Missing Personnel
of Nazi Germany and Its Allies During the Years of
World War II)"]

[Text] [Introductory Letter to Editor] Dear Editors:

In the book "Sovershenno sekretno, tolko dlya komandovaniya" [Top Secret, for Command Eyes Only] (Moscow, Nauka, 1967), the Wehrmacht losses in World War II on the Soviet Front were set at 1,874,000 persons killed, clearly with an accuracy of up to 1,000. The journal POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE (No 3, 1989, p 32) writes about "Ten Million Killed Servicemen of the Red Army During the Years of the Great Patriotic War." The journal LITERATURNYY KIRGIZSTAN (No 10, 1988) gives the losses of those killed in combat at 11 million for our soldiers and 3 million Germans. As they say, who is right? I only fail to understand who gains in this auction. In any event, not the troops. In line with this, I would very much like to know whether VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL intends to remain on the sidelines in the future. If you do not intend to do this, then when can we expect a competent and weighty word on this question?

V.A. Leus (Novosibirsk)

[End of Letter to Editor]

Fifty years ago, on 1 September 1939, the sinister conflagration of World War II broke out. Nazi Germany

captured Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, a significant portion of France, Greece and Yugoslavia, and none of the conquered nations had been able to put up proper resistance to the aggressor.

The rulers of the Nazi Reich thought of destroying the Soviet nation just as rapidly as they had the European states. But they miscalculated. The Great Patriotic War commenced on 22 June 1941. The Soviet Union entered a fatal engagement forced on it by German Nazism and was victorious. World War II in the course of which military operations developed on land, at sea and in the air, ended with the crushing defeat of the nations of the Nazi bloc and imperialist Japan.

The sacrifices of World War II were enormous. Some 55 million persons perished, including 27 million on the battlefield. The war involved the peoples of 62 states. The greatest losses were again suffered, as during the years of World War I, by the European countries (40 million persons) of which over one-half was in the Soviet Union.¹

In using the absence of more complete data on the human casualties in the war, abroad numerous attempts have been made to play down the significance of our victory and the contribution of the Soviet Union to the defeat of Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan.

Recently, the thesis has been heard particularly often that the Russians paid a very dear price for the victory. "The German losses in killed at the front and in the rear were around 4 million persons. Russia paid with the life of 7 persons for each German killed."² Here the author proceeds from simple arithmetic. The Red Army lost 7 million killed and 4 million died as prisoners. The losses of the population from the war, starvation, illnesses, the cold, evacuation, the destruction of dwellings and other disasters have been calculated at 17 million persons. Thus, the author states that the Russians lost a total of up to 28 million persons killed. The English historian N. Davis asserts: "The number of Soviet military losses were around 13 million persons or 4 Soviet soldiers for each dead German."³

The German Institute for Market Research also gives approximately the same figure for the losses of the German Wehrmacht, namely 4.5 million persons.

According to the data of the official statistics of the West German Red Cross given in 1983, the number of German servicemen killed during the years of World War II was 3,810,000 persons.⁴ It is considered that this figure corresponds completely to the official data of the West German government. But the German Bureau for Notifying Close Relatives of Deceased Wehrmacht Servicemen (West Berlin) has estimated that the total German losses in World War II were 7,375,800 persons killed.

The losses of the German people in World War II relating directly to combat reach approximately 6.5

million persons, states the article "Human Casualties in World War II" by Prof Helmut Arntetz.⁵ Other sources state that 6 million Germans fell on the battlefields or encountered death under bombs dropped on the German cities.⁶

According to the official data of the German Democratic Republic, the number of persons killed and missing in Germany during World War II was 6-6.5 million persons. These figures were given in the Appeal to the German People of the SED [Socialist Unity Party] Central Committee, the GDR State Council and Council of Ministers of 11 January 1985 and are confirmed by the research of the History Institute of the GDR National People's Army.

As we can see, many figures are given and they are the most diverse. And they are given without reference to any sources or methods of calculation. Similar figures are also encountered in our periodicals.

"We do not have a clear ratio of the losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht," said the bureau member of the History Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician A.M. Samsonov. "The Western specialists give it as 3.5 to 1 or 5 to 1, respectively, relying on the German reports from the battlefields. However, inherent to any belligerent is the understating of its own losses and the exaggerating of enemy losses."

The leading science associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof A. Mertsalov, feels that up to the present the overall losses of the USSR and Germany have not been clarified and particularly the killed and wounded of the Soviet Army (10 million) and the Wehrmacht (2.8 million), although here he emphasizes that the press also gives other data.⁷

Thus, in the journal VOPROSY ISTORII, No 10, 1988, the Junior Science Associate of the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, V.V. Sokolov, in the article "On the Ratio of the Losses of Personnel and Combat Equipment on the Soviet-German Front in the Course of the Great Patriotic War," gives the following data: "The losses of Germany and its allies on the Eastern Front were around 3 million killed on the battlefield and dead from wounds, while the losses of the Red Army and the troops allied with it on the Soviet-German Front were around 11.1 million persons. The ratio between them was 3.7:1."

However, in our view, the most successful on this question is the Soviet writer, V. Astafyev, who in his inherent "trench aplomb" casually accuses the USSR Armed Forces, including the participants of the Great Patriotic War, that they suffered 10-fold more losses than the enemy and that all "was disgracefully lost by our inspired strategists, politicians and military leaders headed by the greatest leader and teacher."⁸

It would be possible to continue the given list, but we feel there is no need for this. It is much more important, in our view, to try to analyze the data on the losses of Nazi

troops in World War II as a whole and on the Soviet-German Front in particular. But we would first like to repudiate the arguments that the Soviet Union paid for its victory a price which makes no sense even to talk about while the German people suffered comparatively small losses. The following figures are quoted in substantiation of this: the German casualties were around 4 million persons killed and for the Soviet Union over 20 million; here a ratio for the losses of 1:5 is given. Let us endeavor to analyze this.

In the first place, incomparable amounts are being compared. For Nazi Germany they take only the killed and missing of the Wehrmacht, that is, losses in the course of hostilities while for the Soviet Union they use the killed and missing of the entire population of the nation, including those who perished from hunger and illness, in the concentration camps and forced labor in Germany, and so forth.

It is essential to bear in mind that the number of killed and missing in the Soviet Union included traitors of the motherland who fought against the Soviet Army (the Vlasov and Banderov troops, the SS formations from the Baltic and Central Asian peoples) as well as persons working in the occupation personnel of Nazi Germany (police, village elders, translators and so forth) as well as in the construction and worker battalions and at the plants and factories of the occupiers.

Secondly, they do not consider the goals of the opposing sides in the war. The Soviet Union was fighting the army of Nazi Germany and did not pursue the goal of destroying the German people. In the course of military operations, the Soviet people defended their freedom and independence, as it was a matter of the existence of the Soviet state and the people populating it. Nazi Germany, in addition to the war plans, pursued the goals of destroying the Slavic and other peoples of our country. The Nazis steadily carried out this goal, destroying the completely innocent population of the Soviet Union.

It is also known that military operations on the territory of our nation continued for over 3 years and for less than 5 months on German territory. Hence the colossal losses of the civilian population of the Soviet Union and which are in no way comparable to the losses of Germany.

Thirdly, in the literature published in West Germany and in other Western nations, the human casualties of Nazi Germany in World War II are understated in every possible way. The data of the foreign press often without proper analysis are widely employed by certain writers and even historians of our nation. In a majority of the Western publications, the casualties of Germany are counted only within the frontiers of the Reich (1937). Here the losses of the Austrians and Sudeten Germans as well as persons of foreign origin serving in the Wehrmacht are not included in these data.

Fourthly, in giving the ratios of killed and missing of the Soviet Union and Germany (1:5, 1:7, 1:10 and so forth), many authors do not consider the losses of the allies of

Hitler Germany in the Nazi bloc, including Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland, as well as the various foreign formations (Slovak and Spanish divisions, the Vlasov, Baltic and Moslem units and formations) fighting as part of the Nazi troops. If one compares the casualties of the armies of the states of the Nazi bloc on the Soviet-German Front, then the casualties of the satellite countries and the foreign formations comprise almost more than 35 percent of all the Wehrmacht losses.

Thus, the data given in the press on the ratio of killed and missing of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany during the years of World War II are incorrect and do not correspond to the actual state of affairs, and here the goal is pursued of playing down in every possible way such an obvious contribution by the Soviet Union to the defeat of Nazi Germany and the liberation of a whole series of nations of Southeast and Central Europe.

In this context we would like to remind certain writers of the well-known statement by the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who could scarcely be suspected of great sympathy for our country. He wrote that no government ever established by humans could withstand the blow so cruel and merciless which Hitler unleashed against Russia and urged the British to learn from the Soviet people loyalty and dedication to their leaders and government.⁹

The authors of the article offered here to the reader, in line with their official activities, were concerned with establishing the casualties of Hitler Germany in World War II. For this purpose they examined the German documentary materials, scientific works and various articles in the periodical press describing the losses of the German people.

First of all, let us endeavor to understand what is meant by "military killed and missing of the population" during the war period. According to the German documents this concept includes the losses of servicemen (killed, missing and medical) as well as the death of the civilian population on the front and in the rear.

The killed and missing personnel of the armed forces includes persons killed, dying from wounds and illnesses in medical institutions and at home and related to the use of weapons, the missing in action as well as non-combat losses (as a result of accidents, executions and so forth). In the official documents of Nazi Germany there is no such category of killed and missing as prisoners of war. They, as a rule, are put in the category of missing in action.

Medical (temporary) losses of the armed forces personnel include those wounded, with concussions, sick, with frostbite and heat prostration. Here the documents of Nazi Germany consider only those wounded (burned, frostbite and so forth) who were evacuated into the rear.

The killed and missing of the peaceful population of Germany include those killed in the course of combat, by

enemy aviation bombing and artillery fire and those dying from hunger and illness and for other reasons.

However, in examining the question of the human losses of states in the war, it is essential to bear in mind that the killed and missing of the armed forces and the military killed and wounded of a nation are not identical. The losses of the armed forces are always greater since they include such categories of losses as wounded who are disabled and prisoners of war who are not losses for the state.

To determine with sufficient accuracy the data on the casualties of the armed forces of Nazi Germany and its satellites in World War II presents great difficulties, since in the documentary materials and published sources either the necessary information is lacking or this is contradictory, sometimes unobjective and does not reflect the true state of affairs. For example, the reports from the troops do not show the losses of the rear and service units, subunits and facilities as well as the paramilitary formations such as construction ones and which were manned with civilians from other countries (Czechs, Poles, French, Serbs, Croats and so forth). Included in the German losses, as was already stated above, were not the Slovak and Spanish divisions, the Moslem battalions and the traitors from the Russian liberation army (the Vlasov followers) the number of which in 1944 reached 800,000 men. As a total during the period from 1942 through 1945, more than a million former Red Army servicemen fought on the side of the Nazis.¹⁰

The materials of the Wehrmacht General Staff are considered to be the main source on the losses of the armed forces of Nazi Germany in World War II, as here over the entire period of the war monthly summaries were compiled on the losses of personnel, armament and equipment. Here they established a central bureau and department for accounting for the losses of the armed forces and all the organizational and accounting bodies of the armed services, combat arms and services turned over data on the losses here. Here they analyzed and assembled the most complete material on the losses as a whole. The last such general summary was drawn up on 14 March 1945, after which the collecting of data was halted due to the disruption of command over the German Armed Forces on the threshold of its final defeat. This last summary contained data on the German troop losses as of 31 January 1945.

As is seen from Table 1, one-half of the losses was due to wounded, however the number of persons dying from wounds in hospitals is not given. Moreover, the Table gives data as of 31 January 1945 and yet to come was a more than 3-month fierce struggle up to the surrender of the Nazi troops.

Table 1

Type of Losses	Total	Army	Navy	Air Force
Killed on battlefield	1,810,061	1,622,561	48,904	138,596
Dying for other reasons	191,338	Not given		
Wounded	4,429,875	4,188,037	25,259	216,579
Missing in action	1,902,704	1,646,316	100,256	156,132
Total	8,333,978	7,456,914	174,419	511,307

On 10 May 1945, the Staff of the Operations Leadership of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces prepared information on the total losses of the Nazi land army (including the SS Troops and the ground units of the Luftwaffe) over the period from 1 September 1939 through 1 May 1945 (Table 2).

Table 2

Type of Losses	Period from 1 Sep 39 thru 31 Dec 44	Over Period from 1 Jan thru 1 May 45 (calc. data)	Period from 1 Sep 39 thru 1 May 45
Killed	1,757,000	250,000	2,007,000
Missing in action	1,610,000	1,000,000	2,610,000
Total losses	3,367,000	1,250,000	4,617,000

In contrast to the data given in the summary of 14 March 1945 (Table 1), this does not consider the wounded and the losses of the Air Force and Navy, and this led to a situation where the final figure of the losses (not counting the last days of fighting) were almost half the amount. The calculated data for the period for January through May 1945 arouse great doubts as these came from the average figures for losses during the war years and during this period they were significantly greater. The data of this source were also used in the work of Muller-Hillebrand "The German Land Army 1933-1945" (Moscow, 1976, Vol 3).

In determining the losses of the personnel of the Nazi German Armed Forces, we have taken as the basis the German archival document reports on the losses of the chief of the Medical Service under the General Staff of the Ground Forces (OKH) and the data of Casualty Count Department of the Staff of the Armed Forces (OKW), the diaries and summaries of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command, the information of the German Bureau for Notifying Close Relatives of Deceased Wehrmacht Servicemen, the results of research of foreign sources as well as the corresponding publications in the Soviet and foreign press.

Having analyzed all the information available to us, it can be concluded that the persons killed and missing in the armed forces of Nazi Germany in World War II were 7,413,000 persons (Table 3).

Table 3

No.	Name	Total	On Soviet-German Front
1.	Wehrmacht and SS Troops (within 1937 German frontiers)	6,439,000	5,151,000
	—Including:		
	—Killed and dying from wounds	3,050,000	2,440,000
	—Missing in action, prisoners	3,176,000	2,549,000
	—Noncombat losses (dying from illnesses, killed as a result of accidents and so forth)	213,000	162,000
2.	Austrians, Sudeten Germans, natives of Alsace-Lorraine serving in Wehrmacht	600,000	560,000
3.	Foreign formations of Wehrmacht and SS Troops (Spanish and Slovak divisions, Vlasov, Moslem, Baltic and other formations)	374,000	335,000
	Total	7,413,000	6,046,000

Considering that after the war some 1,939,000 German prisoners of war returned to Germany from the Soviet Union,¹¹ the killed and missing of its armed forces were 5,474,000 men. Medical losses (wounded, frostbite, sunstroke) were 6,035,000 men, including 4,870,000 men on the Soviet-German Front. The killed and missing of Nazi Germany do not include foreigners in the rear units and facilities, in construction and other jobs (the count for this category of individuals is lacking in the German documents).

The overall losses of Germany consist of the killed and missing of its armed forces (5,474,000 persons) and the losses of the German civilian population (killed in bombings, missing, the victims of terror which were approximately 3,300,000 persons). The killed and missing of Germany number 8,774,000 persons. The figures obtained by us fit closely with what was given in the materials of a scientific conference of the Commission of Soviet and East German Historians in Berlin on the subject "German Imperialism and World War II" held on 14-19 December 1959.

For a fuller picture of the losses of the armed forces of the Nazi bloc in World War II, it is essential to consider the losses of the German satellites including Italy, Hungary, Romania and France. These were 1,245,000 persons (killed, dying from wounds, missing in action and prisoners). The losses given in Table 4 have been compiled basically from national sources.

Table 4

No.	Satellite Country	Total	On Soviet-German Front
1.	Italy	330,000	90,000
2.	Finland	85,000	85,000
3.	Hungary	350,000	350,000
4.	Romania	480,000	480,000
	Total	1,245,000	1,005,000

Thus, the military killed and missing in the countries of the Nazi bloc in World War II (not counting the losses of the German civilian population as well as those of its satellites) were 8,658,000 persons (Table 5).

Table 5

No.	Name	Total	On Soviet-German Front
1.	Armed Forces of Nazi Germany	7,413,000	6,046,000
2.	Armies of German satellites	1,245,000	1,005,000
	Total	8,658,000	7,051,000

In the appendices to the article, we have given information characterizing the human casualties (killed, missing and medical) of the armed forces of Nazi Germany on the Soviet-German Front for the individual periods of the Great Patriotic War (Appendix 1), and a copy of a report from the Chief of the Medical Service of the OKH of 24 April 1945 on the losses of the personnel in the German operational army during the period from 22 June 1941 through 20 April 1945 (Appendix 2).

The data given in the article on the killed and missing of Nazi Germany and its satellites, in our view, irrefutably show that the Soviet-German Front, undoubtedly, was the main front of World War II. The fate of the Armed Forces of the Nazi Reich was determined precisely here.

The authors of the article do not insist on the absolute accuracy of the figures given for the losses and would be very grateful to those readers who submit to the journal's editors the results of their own research or who clarify individual parameters and figures of the losses.

As for the killed and missing of the Soviet Union in World War II, this work is continuing and the results will be published after it is complete.

Footnotes

1. D.M. Proektor, "Mirovyie voyny i sudby chelovechestva (razmyshleniya)" [World Wars and the Fates of Mankind (Reflections)], Moscow, Mysl, 1986, p 121.
2. W.A. Zambrzicky, "Germano-sovetskaya voyna 1941-1945 gg." [The German-Soviet War of 1941-1945], New York, 1967.
3. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 14 February 1988.
4. Martin C. Serge, "Drugaya tsena vojna Gitlera" [The Other Price of Hitler's War], U.S.A., Greenwood Press.
5. "Itogi vtoroy mirovoy voyny: Sbornik statey" [Results of World War II: Collection of Articles], Moscow, Izd-vo Inostrannoy Literatury, 1957.
6. "Rokovyye resheniya" [Fatal Decisions], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1958.
7. SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 15 May 1988.
8. SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, 25 March 1989.
9. KOMMUNIST, No 1, 1986.
10. Jurgen Thorwald, "The Illusion: Soviet Soldiers in Hitler's Armies," Zurich, 1974.
11. B.Ts. Urtanis, "Voyny i narodonaseleniye Yevropy" [Wars and the Population of Europe], Moscow, Sotsekonmgiz, 1960, p 200.

Appendix 1: Casualties of the Armed Forces of Nazi Germany on the Soviet-German Front From 22 June 1941 Through 9 May 1945

Periods	Land Army	Air Force and Air Defense	Navy	SS Troops
22 Jun 41 thru 30 Jun 42	[1,980,000]	[66,800]	[13,900]	40,000
1 Jul 42 thru 30 Jun 43	[1,985,000]	[66,700]	[13,800]	45,000
1 Jul 43 thru 30 Nov 43	[1,223,000]	106,000	58,000	25,000
30 Nov 43 thru 30 Jun 44	[873,000]		—	
1 Jul 44 thru 1 Aug 44	[686,000]	530,000	320,000	140,000
1 Aug 44 thru 1 Nov 44	[1,192,000]		—	
1 Nov 44 thru 31 Dec 44	[984,000]		—	
1 Jan 45 thru 28 Feb 45	[927,000]	430,500	114,300	100,000
1 Mar 45 thru 9 May 45	[1,750,000]		—	
	[11,600,000]*	1,200,000	550,000	350,000
Total		13,700,000		

* Including 603,200 persons for losses of the Air Force, Air Defense, Navy and SS Troops which suffered by these combat arms as a consequence of employing them as infantry.

Note: 1. Casualties are calculated by the method of comparing the data on the total size of the armed forces at the beginning of each year and the number of recruits received over the year with the data on their total number by the end of the year. The obtained difference is correlated with the available documentary materials of the Nazi Command and Staffs and the discrepancy with the documents concerning the losses was very insignificant.

2. Figures in brackets taken from German documents without any changes.

Chief of Medical Service OKH
General Staff of Ground Troops
Quartermaster General

File 1335Z (Department of Affairs of Junior Command and Rank-and-File Personnel)

No 020/45 Top Secret

Headquarters OKH
24 April 1945

Top Secret

Appendix 2: Losses of Personnel in Operational Army From 22 June 1941 Through 28 April 1945

EAST:								
Armies (Army Commands)	Killed		Wounded		Missing in Action		Total	
	Total	Incl Officers	Total	Incl Officers	Total	Incl Officers	Total	Incl Officers
2d Panzer Army	3,665	111	17,730	382	716	46	25,011	539
6th Army	11,561	348	49,575	1,398	57,741	160	118,877	1,906
6th Panzer Army SS	1,934	101	8,839	280	3,312	25	14,085	406
2d Army	46,639	1,649	195,942	5,157	29,099	317	271,680	7,123
1st Panzer Army	99,023	3,698	399,734	11,077	110,150	1,153	608,907	15,928
11th Army	60,709	1,891	263,964	5,922	70,901	916	395,574	8,729
4th Panzer Army	76,762	2,900	311,328	8,861	69,431	1,237	457,521	12,998
9th Army	87,076	2,957	331,531	8,756	123,447	1,195	542,054	12,908
3d Panzer Army	4,212	138	21,152	519	44,158	1,173	69,522	1,830
Staff of Army East Prussia	68,250	2,424	277,152	7,258	53,441	680	398,843	10,362
4th Army	110,372	3,501	425,203	10,721	169,386	3,846	704,961	18,068
Staff of Operations Group Semland	46,545	1,415	195,348	4,483	95,497	501	337,390	6,399
18th Army	101,677	2,902	416,912	8,889	46,001	563	564,590	12,354
16th Army	96,899	2,891	378,501	8,880	37,566	427	512,966	12,198
Other	7,111	194	16,656	354	9,084	127	32,851	675
Various	183,078	6,216	682,495	18,057	446,244	11,022	1,311,817	35,295
Total Number	1,005,413	33,336	3,992,062	100,994	1,369,174	23,388	6,366,649	157,718
2d Mountain Army	16,373	513	60,419	1,430	6,851	142	83,643	2,085
Army Group D	22	2	96	5	1	—	119	7
Total Number	16,395	515	60,515	1,435	6,852	142	83,762	2,092

WEST:								
25th Army	531	6	1,139	23	1,491	10	3,161	39
1st Paratrooper Army	4,493	112	15,498	290	35,256	403	55,247	805
Army Group blumen- tritt	Information Not Received							
von Luttwitz Grouping	—	—	—	—	50,000	1,500	50,000	1,500
5th Panzer Army	16,159	574	55,115	1,446	183,407	3,979	254,681	5,999
15th Army	11,405	416	36,770	984	198,352	4,098	246,527	5,498
11th Army	Information Not Received							
7th Army	20,362	770	63,234	1,791	133,521	2,095	217,117	4,656
1st Army	13,803	581	48,181	1,485	74,890	1,185	136,874	3,251
19th Army	8,657	282	28,368	743	73,201	1,028	110,226	2,053
Remainder	1,895	79	4,483	120	1,854	53	8,232	252
6th Tank Army	4,091	153	14,689	429	6,881	159	25,661	741
Total	81,396	2,973	267,477	7,311	758,853	14,510	1,107,726	24,974

Note: Information in the column "Missing in Action" for the von Luttwitz Grouping, the 5th Panzer Army and the 15th Army are given on the basis of reports on the personnel of 10 March 1945.

Appendix 2: Losses of Personnel in Operational Army From 22 June 1941 Through 28 April 1945 (Continued)**SOUTHWEST:**

Liguria	213	10	572	35	361	4	1,146	49
14th Army	17,489	561	60,534	1,362	46,780	661	124,803	2,584
10th Army	29,240	1,093	108,317	3,153	165,449	4,732	303,006	8,978
Other	1,125	45	3,208	93	1,458	32	5,791	170
Total	48,067	1,709	172,631	4,643	214,048	5,429	434,746	11,781

SOUTHEAST:

Army Group E	11,956	326	36,821	852	13,681	158	62,508	1,336
Other	8,821	290	28,348	781	10,295	149	47,464	1,220
Total	20,777	616	65,219	1,633	23,976	307	109,972	2,556
Grand Total	1,172,048	39,149	4,557,904	116,016	2,372,903	43,776	8,102,859	198,941

By Authorization (signature illegible)

Colonel of Medical Service

Department Chief

TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 500, inv. 12526, sheets 33, frame 1845.

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Hungary, 1956

904P0003E VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 9, Sep 89 (signed to press 9 Sep 89) pp
42-50

[Article by Army Gen P.N. Lashchenko: "Hungary, 1956"]

[Text] "We are profoundly grateful to our Soviet brothers for the aid rendered by them to the Hungarian people in a difficult time. This aid played a decisive role in allowing the Hungarian people to defeat the counterrevolution and now move forward firmly and confidently along the path of socialism."

Yanos Kadar

From a speech at the 22d CPSU Congress

In the second half of 1956, Hungary became the scene of tragic events. Over a period of several weeks in Budapest and other cities as well as in the major population points, a struggle was occurring. The domestic counterrevolution, with the active support of the most reactionary forces of international imperialism, particularly the United States and West Germany, endeavored to overthrow the socialist regime and install a bourgeois one. The intelligence and even the governmental bodies of the Western countries were actively involved in organizing the counterrevolutionary coup. The coup in Hungary was prepared for directly not only by the intelligence services but also by the staff of the president and the U.S. Congress. At the end of 1955, at a meeting with the Hungarian emigres in Munich, the presidential advisor Rockefeller set out a plan of subversive activity and for implementing this American intelligence has worked out and illegally distributed in Hungary a program for overthrowing the existing order. In the aim of broadening the

subversive activities organized by American intelligence and carried out by the counterrevolutionary forces in Hungary, of the \$100 million allocated for conducting subversive work against the socialist countries, a large part came to be assigned to the needs of the Hungarian counterrevolutionaries.

Along with American intelligence, an active part in initiating the counterrevolutionary coup was taken by the closely linked West German led by the former Nazi Gen Gehlen. In West Germany, special camps functioned where American instructors, Gehlen's intelligence agents and members of the Hungarian Fascist organizations trained personnel for subversive work in Hungary. In addition to this, long before the start of the counterrevolutionary coup, a number of stations were opened for recruiting Horthy followers and other emigre riffraff and training them for subversive work. There assembled the remnants of the Horthy Army and police which had tied to the West. In undergoing certain training supported by American money, they were sent into Hungary. One such station was located in Munich.

Simultaneously in England, detachments were organized of counterrevolutionaries with several hundred men in each for dispatch to Hungary. France also prepared armed groups. The trained terrorists, saboteurs and bandits in groups of several persons concentrated in Austria and there illegally were moved across the Austro-Hungarian frontier into Hungary. This was done with the assistance of the Austrian border service which ensured their unimpeded crossing.

It must be said that by this time, upon the decision of the Hungarian government, all the obstacles on the Austro-Hungarian frontier had been removed and the border security was weakened. In essence, anyone could move freely from Austria into Hungary and of course the organizers of the revolt used this widely.

In October 1956, at a conference in Munich the former general of the Horthy Army, Hugo Sonja, stated that a corps of 11,000 men was ready for actions in Hungary. The American representative Maj Jackson promised the necessary material aid and transport for moving these forces. Voice of America and Radio Free Europe intensified their activities and in their broadcasts they constantly urged the overthrow of people's power, coming out against the reforms and nationalization of the enterprises and constantly exaggerating the errors made by the Hungarian Workers Party (MMP) in leading the nation. In the summer of 1956, they intensified the appeals for the violent overthrow of the state system in the Hungarian People's Republic, stating here that Hungarians living in the West had already initiated active preparations for the coup. At the same time, within the nation underground work was intensified, particularly among the students and the intelligentsia as well as the Horthy Fascist elements.

In the October events, a perfidious role was played by the party opposition headed by Imre Nagy and Geza Losonczy, the counterrevolutionary essence of whom was apparent only in the course of the defeat of the coup. As became known, Nagy and Losonczy took an active part in preparing the revolt and also led the counterrevolutionary forces in the course of it. In December 1955, under the leadership of Imre Nagy, still long before the start of the counterrevolutionary coup, an antistate conspiracy was prepared in the aim of seizing power.

In January of the following year, he wrote an article entitled "Certain Urgent Questions" in which he proposed abandoning the power of the working class and outlined a plan to restore a multiparty system and for concluding an alliance with the forces opposing the people's democracy. In another article entitled "Five Basic Principles of International Relations" he established the idea of eliminating the Warsaw Pact.

These documents were illegally disseminated among the public by members of the group and by persons loyal to Nagy. His group widely employed legal opportunities, particularly in working among the intelligentsia, for undermining and discrediting popular power. Nagy revealed the true sense of the "Hungarian path of socialism" in the course of the revolt when the opposition began to implement the previously elaborated plans to eliminate the state system of the Hungarian People's Republic.

A great deal of harm was caused by the demagogic agitation caused by the activities of a certain portion of the intelligentsia and particularly the "Petofi Circle." The "Petofi Circle" established in 1955 to propagandize the ideas of Marxism-Leninism among the youth was turned into an assembly of hostile elements where under the guise of debate measures directed against people's power were carried out.

Thus, the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary was not an accidental or spontaneous phenomenon, it was

prepared for carefully and ahead of time by the internal counterrevolution with the active support of the international reaction.

* * *

Long before the start of the counterrevolutionary revolt, upon the request of the government of the Hungarian People's Republic, the Soviet troops of the Special Corps were temporarily stationed on the territory of the nation in different towns; there were none in Budapest. Units of the corps strictly according to plan participated in military and political training, numerous tactical exercises and drills were carried out during the day and at night, including with field firing, and courses were taken in the firing from and driving of tanks, armored personnel carriers and motor vehicles. A great deal of attention was given to training flight personnel of aviation units, specialists of the combat arms and special troops as well as the safekeeping of weapons and combat equipment.

Friendly relations were established between the Soviet and Hungarian troops as well as with the public. The Hungarian citizens were grateful to the Soviet soldiers and officers for the help provided to them during the great flood in the spring of 1956 in the area of the middle courses of the Danube. In risking their lives, our troops rescued people, livestock, state and private property of the citizens. Many of them were awarded orders and medals of the Hungarian People's Republic for the heroism shown in carrying out the rescue work.

Good and honest relations were maintained until the summer of 1956. Then we began to feel the pernicious influence of hostile propaganda among the public and the personnel of the Hungarian Army and relations became complex with certain Hungarian troop units.

We learned that in Budapest the "Petofi Circle" was holding debates with attacks on the MMP, and the youth called for antigovernment actions. The press published articles which contained slander of the existing order, the authority of the government was undermined, and hostile forces called for antistate actions. The command of the Special Corps received information on the more frequent trips by American and English military attaches to Austria to contact the Hungarian emigres in the West as well as that Radio Free Europe in its broadcasts in Hungarian and with the aid of the releasing of balloons organized by it carrying propaganda literature called for actions against the Hungarian Republic.

In the morning of 23 October, over the radio and in the press it was announced that the Hungarian government had banned a student demonstration, however at 1300 hours a new announcement followed on the government's permission for this demonstration and that the MMP had issued instructions to the party members to take an active part in it. Thus, in Budapest, on 23 October 1956, at 1400 hours there began a demonstration involving around 200,000 persons. In their majority these were students and intellectuals as well as a portion of the workers, party members and servicemen.

Gradually the demonstration assumed an antigovernment nature. Its participants chanted slogans (largely in the spirit of the program of 16 points proposed by the members of the "Petofi Circle"), demanding the restoring of the Hungarian national emblem, eliminating military instruction and Russian-language lessons and the return of the old national holiday instead of the day of liberation from fascism. In addition, they demanded the holding of free elections and the creation of a government headed by Imre Nagy and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. The demonstrators began to tear off the insignias of the national crest from the national flags of Hungary and then burn red flags. Under the cover of the demonstration, armed detachments of the counterrevolution began operating. In the aim of seizing ammunition and weapons, they attacked the buildings of the rayon centers of the Hungarian Volunteer Alliance for the Defense of the Motherland which were virtually unguarded. In the course of these attacks, the rebels made off with over 500 rifles, pistols and several thousand cartridges. The counterrevolutionary elements attacked the soldiers of the Hungarian People's Army and took away their weapons, and then the bandits began to attack police headquarters, barracks, weapons dumps and plants.

Some 2 hours after the start of the student demonstration in Budapest, armed detachments of counterrevolutionaries began seizing major military and state installations. Trucks appeared on the streets and squares of Budapest and weapons and ammunition began to be distributed from them.

Vehicles with armed soldiers from the Hungarian People's Army were unable to make their way to the city center. In some place pro-Fascist elements disarmed the soldiers and often the latter joined the rebels.

As became known later, the heads of the counterrevolution had prepared ahead of time for the armed actions. All their actions were aimed at quickly defeating the state and party apparatus, demoralizing the army, and creating chaos in the nation in order, under these conditions, to carry out their black deeds. On 23 October, at around 2000 hours in the evening, the terrorists spread a rumor through Budapest that "students had been killed at the radio committee." This greatly excited the public. In actuality, the state security workers defending the radio committee had not fired although the armed Fascist vans had endeavored to seize the building and even fired into the crowd. Only after midnight, when there were already many killed and wounded among the guard of the radio committee, did the guard receive orders to fire.

However, several students, carelessly dressed young people and older men succeeded in breaking into the radio station. They called themselves delegates from those assembled on the street and demanded the immediate halt to broadcasting, the removing of the microphone from the building and the reading of the 16 points

of the "demands" which, among other things, insisted on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

At 1000 hours, speaking over the radio was the First Secretary of the MMP Central Committee Erno Gero, but the crowd by the radio committee did not hear his speech. At the same time, machine gun and automatic bursts were already cracking in many areas of the city. Killed was the State Security Major, Laszlo Magyar, who had emerged from the doors of the radio studio to persuade the people to disperse.

During the night of 24 October, the counterrevolutionaries attacked the editorial offices of the central party newspaper SZABAD NEP, the telephone exchange, the main police headquarters of Budapest and the district police headquarters, the weapons dumps and plants, barracks, bases and garages and the freight shipping offices. The bridge over the Danube was seized. The only vehicles which could cross the Margit Bridge were ones carrying passengers who could give the password "Petofi." A cursory analysis of these events shows that the counterrevolutionaries had prepared ahead of time and had their own military leading center. By capturing the radio station and the editorial offices of the newspaper SZABAD NEP, they would deprive the party and the government of the means of shaping public opinion in the nation: in capturing weapons and ammunition at the dumps, the weapons plants, in the police headquarters and barracks, they could arm the counterrevolution; in capturing the means of transport they could broaden the possibilities for maneuvering the reactionary forces.

For implementing their plan, the rebels were well organized. Armed detachments and groups were established from the declassé and criminal elements, weapons dumps were organized and the most advantageous positions seized.

At the beginning of the revolt, the counterrevolutionaries, in essence, did not encounter any serious resistance from the forces of people's power. Even in the district police headquarters, they captured weapons without any resistance. When the Main Police Headquarters began receiving reports from the district police headquarters on the appearance of "demonstrators" demanding weapons, the Chief of the Headquarters, Lt Col Sandor Kopaci, ordered not to fire on the rebels and not to intervene in their actions. A crowd assembled in front of the building of the Main Police Headquarters. When those assembled demanded the release of prisoners and the removal of the red stars from the facade of the building, Sandor Kopaci unhesitatingly carried out these demands. The actions of the police chief caused feverish excitement. Shouts rang out to him: "Appoint Sandor Kopaci minister of internal affairs!" Later, it became known that Kopaci was a member of the underground counterrevolutionary center set up by a group of confederates of Imre Nagy for direct leadership of the armed revolt.

The criminal activities of Kopaci were not only in handing over weapons to the counterrevolutionaries but that he, in essence, paralyzed the activities of the Budapest police and with his knowledge over 20,000 firearms were turned over to the rebels.

The events of 23 October and the night of 24 October clearly showed that a counterrevolutionary coup had been initiated in Budapest under the cover of a student demonstration. However, the associates of Imre Nagy who had moved into the building of the Main Police Headquarters described everything which had happened as a "revolution" and as a democratic movement of the masses of people.

During the night of 24 October, Imre Nagy became the head of the government and joined the Politburo of the MMP Central Committee while his supporters were given important positions in the state and party apparatus. This was the next step on the path to carrying out the criminal plan which had been worked out ahead of time by the Nagy group and which, of course, was not known to the MMP Central Committee. During the same night, there was an emergency session of the MMP Central Committee which worked out recommendations to the government on taking decisive measures to restore order and protect the people's republic. It was proposed that they immediately arm the workers loyal to the cause of the revolution and with weapons in hand act against the rebels, crush the counterrevolution, and for this to use the aid of the Soviet troops in the nation in accord with the Warsaw Pact and declare a state of emergency.

Imre Nagy who took part in the work of this session of the party Central Committee approved all these measures without voicing a single dissent. However, this was hypocrisy. He did not intend to defend the system of people's democracy and his plan was diametrically the opposite and included the gradual squeezing out of all communists and persons loyal to socialism from the superior leadership and subsequently carrying out these measures over the entire territory of the nation; the breaking up of the armed forces (army and police); the disorganization of the state apparatus.

In this situation the Hungarian government and the MMP Central Committee was forced to turn to the Soviet government with a request to provide aid using Soviet troops and restore legal order in the Hungarian capital. The Hungarian government sent the USSR Council of Ministers a telegram with the following content:

"In the name of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic, I request that the Soviet government send Soviet troops to help in Budapest to eliminate the disorders occurring in Budapest, for quickly restoring order and establishing conditions for peaceful creative labor."

On 24 October 1956, from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces orders arrived to move troops into Budapest with the task of providing aid to the garrison of Hungarian troops in eliminating the counterrevolutionary coup. In accord with this, units of the Special Corps on the same day began to move into Budapest from the regions of Kecskemet, Cegled, Szekesfehervar and others. They had to make a march of 75-120 km.

The commander of the Special Corps with the operations group of the staff from Szekesfehervar left for Budapest. The column consisted of passenger cars, a radio, several armored personnel carriers and tanks. When the group entered the city, on its streets, regardless of the late hour, excitement reigned and here and there trucks rushed carrying armed groups of civilians and a crowd was milling at the center. Everywhere were people with torches, flags, banners in their hands, and on all sides the sharp sounds of shooting and individual automatic bursts could be heard. It was impossible to reach the building of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense through the central streets and the operations group had a difficult time advancing through the narrow alleys. When one of our radios fell behind the column, it was immediately attacked by rebels. The radio chief was wounded in the head and one of the radio operators was killed. The radio truck was turned over and burned. A group of soldiers sent to help on a tank and an armored personnel carrier saved the crew members who were still alive.

The command post of the commander of the Special Group was located in the building of the Ministry of Defense and there also was the governmental high-frequency link with Moscow and this facilitated the organization of cooperation with the Hungarian Command.

A nervous and panicky situation reigned at the Hungarian Ministry of Defense and the incoming data on events and the actions of the Hungarian units and police were contradictory. The Defense Minister Istvan Bata and particularly the Chief of the General Staff Lajos Tot were in a subdued state and issued contradictory orders. Thus, when the rebels attacked weapons dumps the General Staff sent an order not to fire. The terrorists were already firing everywhere. The Hungarian police subunits were ordered to direct their efforts at protecting installations without ammunition (supposedly in the aim of avoiding bloodshed). In benefiting from this, the counterrevolutionaries took away the weapons from the soldiers.

As soon as the commander of the Special Corps arrived at the General Staff of the Hungarian Armed Forces, the MMP Central Committee and the Ministry of Defense turned to him with a request to reinforce the defenses of the most important installations, post a guard on the buildings of the party district committees, the police headquarters, the barracks, various dumps and even the apartments of individuals. A large number of troops would be required for this and the corps formations had still not arrived in Budapest.

25 April 1990

With the approach of the units of the 2d and 17th Mechanized Division to Budapest, the commander of the Special Corps set tasks for the commanders of the units and formations. The arriving forward units were ordered to guard the buildings of the MMP Central Committee, the Parliament, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the bank, airfield, the bridges across the Danube, the weapons and ammunition dumps; they were to expel the rebels from the building of the radio committee, the railroad stations as well as provide security for the Ministry of Defense, disarm the rebels and turn them over to the Hungarian police.

With the entry into the city, the rebels fired on our subunits from small arms and threw rocks at them, and barricades had already been erected on the city outskirts. The city inhabitants responded differently to the appearance of the Soviet troops: some smiled and waved their hands, thereby demonstrating their good predisposition while others shouted something in irritation, others were sullenly silent while in certain places the rebels opened fire by surprise.

On Jullei and Markusovsky Streets and Hungaria Avenue and on the approaches to certain installations, the Soviet troops encountered automatic fire. Our units went directly into combat and cleared the rebels out of the building of the editorial offices of the newspaper SZABAD NEP, the Central Telephone Exchange, the train stations and military dumps. The exchange of fire grew hotter in the central and southeastern parts of the city: near the building of the radio committee, near the area of the Kirvin Movie Theater on Jullei Street. It was learned that in addition to Budapest, disorders had commenced in other cities such as Szekesfehervar and Kecskemet.

On 24 October, speaking over the radio was the Secretary of the MMP Central Committee, Comrade Janos Kadar. In his speech he said: "Workers, comrades! The student demonstration which began with a significant part of initially acceptable demands has rapidly been turned into a demonstration against our democratic system and under its cover armed actions have commenced...."

"As a cover for the provocateurs who initiated the struggle, they have used the large number of persons who have lost the correct orientation, particularly among the youth. In accord with this...we, in order to avoid further bloodshed, have granted and do grant those who have fallen into confusion and who voluntarily turned themselves in after our appeal the opportunity to save their life and future and to return to honest citizens."

At noon over the Hungarian radio a government decree was announced on the establishing of a state of emergency in Budapest. A curfew was established and the city residents were prohibited from being on the streets before 0700 hours in the morning, or to hold meetings and assemblies; field court-martials were introduced. On 24 October, it was proposed that the rebels cease the

armed struggle and lay down their weapons. Those not carrying out this demand were threatened with a field court-martial.

It turned out that the armed insurrection was basically over. Even the Budapest Radio announced that only individual centers of resistance remained. The exchange of fire had somewhat lessened. However, on 25 and 26 October, the mass disturbances shifted from Budapest to other cities in the nation. In many towns and population points, so-called "revolutionary committees" were established and these seized political power in their hands. They were usually headed by Horthy officers and by representatives of the reactionary portion of the students and intelligentsia.

Many members of the MMP, although remaining loyal to the ideas of communism, during the difficult hours of conflict vacillated and thereby weakened the party. The rebels released fascists and criminals from prison and they, filling out the ranks of the counterrevolutionaries and at the same time assuming a predominant position in the established bodies of authority, intimidated and persecuted the supporters of socialism and all honest patriots.

At the same time, we continued to receive alarming information that prisoners had been released from many prisons and armed emigres were rushing across the Austrian border without encountering any resistance from the border security. Without the knowledge of the party leadership and without agreement from the Soviet Command, Imre Nagy in the morning of 25 October cancelled the curfew which had prohibited the assembling of groups on the streets and the organizing of demonstrations. This impeded the wiping up of the armed centers and provided an opportunity for the rebels to organize new demonstrations.

Endless meetings and sessions of the "revolutionary committees" and worker councils were held at enterprises and institutions, leaflets and appeals were read and constantly new demands of a counterrevolutionary nature were produced. Certain subunits of the Hungarian Army and police, under the influence of the occurring events, disbanded and this provided an opportunity for the rebels to seize a significant amount of weapons and ammunition. A portion of the construction battalions, the antiaircraft units as well as officers from the Budapest garrison went over to the side of the rebels. By the morning of 28 October, the counterrevolutionaries with large forces held the southeastern part of Budapest (100-120 city blocks), a number of installations in Buda and other areas, the entire city had come under crossfire and groups had endeavored to seize Soviet weapons and combat equipment. Decisive actions were essential but the Imre Nagy government demanded that our troops not open fire.

The disintegration of the republic's armed forces was one of the main tasks for Imre Nagy. He decided that the time had come to deal with this directly. First of all,

Nagy ordered the breaking up of the state security headquarters and bodies, he legitimized the counterrevolutionary rebel forces, concealing them under the name of "Detachments of the National Guard" and incorporating them in the so-called "armed forces for the protection of domestic order." The police was also included in them. A "Revolutionary Committee of Armed Forces of Internal Order" was formed for the leadership of these armed forces and the committee also included representatives of the rebels. Nagy appointed Bela Kirai as the leader of the committee and Kirai had been a former officer of the Horthy General Staff who had been sentenced in 1951 to death for espionage but was later reduced to life imprisonment and during the days of the revolt was at liberty. Subsequently, Imre Nagy appointed Maj Gen Bela Kirai to the post of chairman of the "revolutionary committee of armed forces for the protection of domestic order" and gave him instructions to organize a National Guard primarily from "units which had participated in the revolutionary fighting," that is, the rebels.

Bela Kirai went further and asked from Imre Nagy the right to supervise both the Ministry of Defense as well as the Ministry of Internal Affairs in order to purge them of "Rakosites." Now the counterrevolutionaries were provided with weapons from the arsenals of the Army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Around 4,000 carbines, rifles, machine guns and submachine guns were distributed just from one dump located on Timot Street. It should be pointed out that regardless of the instructions of B. Kirai, weapons were not issued to the rebels from the peripheral dumps.

At 1700 hours on 30 October, the Imre Nagy government demanded that the Soviet troops be withdrawn from Budapest. During the night of 31 October, in accord with the decision of the Soviet government, Soviet troops began to be withdrawn from Budapest. By the end of the same day, our troops had been completely withdrawn from the city and were concentrated on its outskirts. Here ended the first stage in the struggle against counterrevolution in Hungary.

After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops to the outskirts of Budapest, the counterrevolutionary bands inspired by the Imre Nagy government began a White Terror against the progressive forces and primarily against the communists, the state security workers and patriots.

They plundered the buildings of the party and state bodies, and destroyed the monuments to the Soviet soldiers who had died in fighting fascism during the years of the Great Patriotic War. The fascists and criminals released from prison joined the rebel ranks, thereby strengthening the reign of terror. As a total, they released and armed around 9,500 criminals, including murderers, robbers and thieves and 3,400 political and military criminals. The Horthy-Fascist bourgeoisie

established its own political groupings and, like mushrooms after the rain, various reactionary parties began to appear and there arose the so-called "Catholic People's Union," "the Democratic People's party," "the Christian Front," "the Hungarian Revolutionary Youth Party" and many others. The counterrevolutionary elements endeavored as quickly as possible to penetrate the state bodies and assume leading posts in the Ministry of Defense. Under their pressure the government appointed the Chief of the Budapest Garrison, Gen Bela Kirai, as the military commandant while Gen Pal Maléter, the military leader of the revolt, became minister of defense.

On 31 October, Cardinal Mindszenty who had been freed by the counterrevolutionaries was brought to Budapest. Imre Nagy stated that Mindszenty had been unjustly accused by the former regime and now he was fully rehabilitated.

In actuality, this was a rabid enemy of people's Hungary. In 1948 he had been arrested for activities aimed at the overthrow of the People's Democracy and was serving his sentence. Several days later, Mindszenty spoke over the radio. In his speech he stated that he considered the People's Democratic regime fallen and solemnly proclaimed private property as the basis of the "restored order."

At the end of October along the entire Austro-Hungarian frontier, the "National Guard" was in control and they opened the state frontier to the enemy of People's Hungary. Who was not swept by the murky wave of counterrevolution across the frontier? There were Horthyites, Nilasists, counts and princes, fascist thugs from the "Crossed Arrows" and the "Hungarian Legion," barons, generals and terrorists who had completed the special schools in the United States and West Germany, fighters from all professions and specialists in street fighting from the times of the Fascist Putsch.

The Fascist-Horthyite bandits were the equal of the Nazi SS troops in atrocities. They burned the communists alive, trampled them to death, gouged out eyes, bestially tortured people and broke their arms and legs. The world before had seen bonfires on which they burned up progressive books, political journals and party newspapers. Exactly the same bonfires had burned in Nazi Germany prior to World War II.

After the storming of the party city committee in Budapest, the counterrevolutionaries hung Col Lajos Szabo by his feet on a steel cable and tortured him to death, and the party committee secretary, Imre Mosa, was murdered. In Budapest and in other cities, thousands of people were victims of the White Terror.

The counterrevolutionary forces which had dominated under the Fascist Horthy regime were sweeping the power of the People's Democracy from the face of the earth, using the Imre Nagy government to achieve their goals.

It is frequently asked what participation was taken by the servicemen of the Hungarian People's Army in suppressing the counterrevolutionary coup in the nation? Many soldiers of the People's Army and patriots of their motherland took an active part in defeating the counterrevolutionary bands. Maj Vartolan is well known in Hungary. He headed the defeat of the bandit group which was led by a former SS officer. However, the Hungarian People's Army which was called upon to defend the people's democratic system was unable independently to defeat the counterrevolution. Certain servicemen acted on the side of the rebels. The leadership of the Ministry of Defense was demoralized by events and unable to control the army.

In siding with the counterrevolution, Maj Gen Pal Maléter, the Police Chief Sandor Kopaci and the Horthyite military leadership headed by Bela Kirai came to terms on the actions to be taken against the Soviet troops at the beginning of November.

After the withdrawal of the troops from Budapest, we closely monitored events in the capital and the actions of the counterrevolution in the nation and we were ready by decisive actions to provide help to the Hungarian people in defending their socialist victories, in defeating the counterrevolution and in eliminating the threat of a restoration of fascism in Hungary.

On 2 November 1946, the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries, MSU I.S. Konev, summoned the commander of the Special Corps to Szolnok and gave him the combat mission: eliminate the counterrevolutionary coup in Budapest. For this purpose, the corps was reinforced with tanks, artillery and airborne troops.

At 0200 hours on 3 November, in accord with the directive of the commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries and the approved plan for conducting the operation, the Special Corps was given the tasks of routing the counterrevolutionary forces in Budapest. I.S. Konev set the combat tasks for the other commanders to defeat the counterrevolution on all Hungarian territory.

At 0500 hours on 4 November, according to the agreed-upon signal which marked the beginning of the operation, the detachments organized to seize installations and the main forces of the divisions in columns along the assigned routes rushed into the city and by decisive actions, in overcoming the rebel resistance, without a pause entered Budapest. By 0730 hours, they were already in control of the bridges across the Danube, the Parliament which had been cleared of rebels, the building of the MMP Central Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the city council, Nogoti Station and other installations. The counterrevolutionary government of Imre Nagy had lost power in the nation. Nagy himself with several persons from his circle, as soon as the Soviet troops began to

enter Budapest, through a secret passage left Parliament, having first announced over the radio that "the government is in its place" and took shelter in the Yugoslav embassy where he requested refuge.

Over the day of fighting, Soviet troops disarmed around 4,000 rebels in Budapest, seized 77 tanks, 2 artillery weapons dumps, 15 antiaircraft batteries and a large amount of small arms.

The attempts to quickly seize Moscow Square, the Royal Fortress and the blocks lying to the south of Mount Gellert, were unsuccessful due to the stubborn resistance from the rebels. As our units advanced to the center of the city, the counterrevolutionaries put up evermore organized and stubborn resistance, particularly when the subunits reached the Central Telephone Exchange, the Korvin area, the Kalion Barracks and Keleti Station.

The commanders were forced to call in significant forces to capture the centers of resistance of the Korvin district, the university campus, Moscow Square and the Royal Fortress where there were 300-500 rebels at each place.

A portion of the Soviet troops under the command of Gens A. Babadzhanian and Kh. Mansurov cleared the rebels out of the other towns and population points of the nation.

As a result of the actions of the Special Corps, during the first half of November, the armed counterrevolutionary coup was eliminated both in Budapest as well as throughout the nation. Having ceased the armed struggle, the remnants of the counterrevolutionary forces went underground.

The rapid defeat of counterrevolution was aided by the circumstance that the rebels did not have strong support from the Hungarian people who quickly recognized the true face of the "freedom fighters" and guessed their plan to restore capitalism in Hungary. During the peak of the fighting from 4 through 10 November, the armed detachments of counterrevolutionaries virtually received no reinforcements. To the honor of the officers of the Hungarian People's Army, it must be said that contrary to the orders of Imre Nagy, they did not lead their subunits and units into combat against the Soviet Army.

Immediately after the defeat of the counterrevolutionary bands, the Soviet troops began to provide the Budapest population with help in normalizing life in the city. Military vehicles delivered food, medicines and building materials which had been supplied in large amounts during those days to Hungary from the fraternal countries.

The armed struggle against the counterrevolutionary forces was over. The political struggle was now in full swing. It was headed by the political party of the Hungarian working class, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP].

The restoring of the communist party was carried out in a difficult situation. The mistakes from the period of the Rakosi cult had undermined party authority, and had shaken the trust of the workers in it, while the treacherous role of Imre Nagy during the days of the reign of counterrevolution led to a situation where the members of the MMP were forced to partially go underground. In such a state, the party had little influence on events and could not fully carry out a leading role.

The defeat of the armed counterrevolution created favorable conditions for rallying the party forces. A temporary MSZMP Central Committee was organized headed by Janos Kadar. The temporary MSZMP Central Committee published an appeal to the Hungarian communists which urged them to join forces, to purge their ranks and, showing loyalty to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, to set to work, relying on the working class and the broad masses of workers. The appeal stated: "Our organizations should be the inspirers of the struggle to defeat the counterrevolution and restore peaceful creative labor."¹

The appeal contained a call to establish friendly relations with the men of the Soviet Army who had come to the defense of people's power in Hungary. It also stated: "In order for it to be clear to everyone that we want to put an end once and for all to the errors of the past, we have decided to change the name of our party; we are assuming the name of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party."²

Along with the name of the party, the name of its central printing organ was also changed and the newspaper SZABAD NEP began to be called NEPSZABASAG ("People's Freedom").

The honest patriots of their motherland who were dedicated to the ideals of communism and who had devoted all their lives to the struggle for the people's cause, Comrades Janos Kadar, Antal Apro, Ferenc Munnich and many others who had shown initiative in forming the Hungarian revolutionary worker-peasant government headed the creation of the new party.

By the end of December, the situation in Hungary had changed substantially. This was felt particularly in Budapest. The enterprises and state institutions began operating everywhere. Exercises were conducted normally in the schools and institutions of higher learning. Municipal transport operated continuously. The destruction was rapidly eliminated.

The City Council—the people's power which the counterrevolutionaries had endeavored to destroy—resumed its activities in November and simultaneously all 22 district councils of Budapest began operating. Great work lay ahead to eliminate the consequences of the counterrevolutionary coup.

Along with the resuming of the activities of the bodies of people's power such as the city and district councils, throughout the nation the work of the people's police,

court bodies and procurator's office resumed. They ensured order and tranquility, they neutralized the counterrevolution gangs which had committed murders in the back streets and endeavored to terrorize the public. In establishing order, the Hungarian judicial bodies strictly adhered to socialist legality. All conditions were established in the nation for normal, creative peaceful work of the public.

The years passed. The Hungarian people under the leadership of the MSZMP have healed the wounds caused by the counterrevolution in 1956 and in a fraternal alliance with all the socialist countries are successfully and rapidly building a socialist society.

Footnotes

1. "O sobytiakh v Vengrii. Fakty i dokumenty" [On Events in Hungary. Facts and Documents], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1957, p 103.

2. Ibid., p 101.

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TO HELP THOSE STUDYING MILITARY HISTORY

Liberation of Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia

904P0003F VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 9, Sep 89 (signed to press 9 Sep 89)
pp 51-60

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences A.V. Antosyak:
"The Liberation of the Western Ukraine and Western
Belorussia"]

[Text] September of the current year marks the 50th anniversary of the liberation of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia and in November our nation will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the reunification of the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples.

On 17 September 1939, the USSR Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.P. Potemkin in Moscow handed the Polish Ambassador W. Grzybowski a note which stated: "The Polish-German War has disclosed the internal instability of the Polish state. Over a period of 10 days of military operations, Poland has lost all its industrial regions and cultural centers.... The Polish government has collapsed and does not show any signs of life. This means that the Polish state and its government have actually ceased to exist. Thereby, the treaties concluded between the USSR and Poland have ceased to be in effect. Abandoned and left without leadership, Poland has been turned into a convenient field for all sorts of accidents and surprises which could be a threat for the USSR. For this reason, being hitherto neutral, the Soviet government cannot remain neutral to these facts any longer.

"The Soviet government also cannot be indifferent to the fact that the blood-related Ukrainians and Belorussians who live on Polish territory and who have been abandoned to fate have been left unprotected.

"Due to this situation the Soviet government has issued orders to the Red Army High Command to order the troops to cross the frontier and assume protection of the life and property of the populus in the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia.

"At the same time, the Soviet government intends to take every measure to release the Polish people from the evil war in which it has been drawn by its unreasonable leaders and give them an opportunity to live a peaceful life."¹

On the eve of World War II, the USSR gave particular significance to preventing a German attack on Poland and the Baltic states. The Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs V.P. Potemkin who arrived in Warsaw on 10 May 1939 proposed the concluding of a Soviet-Polish Mutual Aid Treaty. However, the Polish government refused to accept this proposal, hoping that it would still be able to reach agreement with Germany. Having refused to permit Soviet troops across Polish territory in the event of German aggression, it contributed to the undermining of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks on mutual aid and a military convention. In condemning such a policy, the French Ambassador to the USSR P.E. Naggiar in a telegram to the French Ambassador L. Noel in Poland on 25 August commented: "Actually it is difficult to imagine how we could hope to gain from the USSR that it would accept obligations against Germany which is so earnestly treating with the USSR, if the Poles and Romanians guaranteed by us do not want to hear anything about Russian aid.

"Hitler, without hesitating, would take the action which Beck with our guarantee has refused to make."²

The fact that it was impossible to prevent German aggression was not the fault of the Soviet Union but rather of those forces which did not wish to achieve a true agreement with our country and forced the Soviet government to conclude the Nonaggression Pact with Germany.

The invasion of Poland by Nazi troops caused concern in the Soviet leadership over the security of our nation. Regardless of the signing of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Treaty on 23 August 1939, there was no guarantee that the Nazis, in occupying Poland, would not attack the USSR. For this reason at the beginning of September, precautionary measures were taken: a major training assembly was conducted for the reserve troops in six military districts; the demobilizing of reenlisted personnel was halted; leaves were canceled; the troops, weapons and transport were put on combat alert³ in the initial Belorussian, Kiev Special Military Districts and the Leningrad Military District.

The Soviet government endeavored to maintain relations with Germany on a level which would make it possible to rebuff German claims and pressures without leading to a military clash. It decisively rejected the attempts by Hitler to involve the USSR in a war with Poland, and endeavored to halt Nazi expansion as far away as possible from its own frontiers and obtain treaty guarantees that the German troops would not invade beyond the agreed-upon line of the "demarcation of interests" of the USSR and Germany either in the event of the "peaceful" or the violent conquest of Poland by Germany.

Regardless of the hostile attitude of the bourgeois Polish government to our nation, the Soviet Union initiated steps to provide aid to its neighbor. As was pointed out in his memoirs by the former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Beck, during the first days of the war, talks were held between Beck and the Soviet Ambassador to Warsaw N. Sharonov.*

In the course of these, Sharonov stated Soviet readiness to provide Poland with an opportunity to purchase extremely essential goods from the USSR and in particular medical materials. The Soviet ambassador issued a visa to a representative of the Polish government to travel to Moscow in the aim of conducting the corresponding talks. However, it was not possible to carry out this possibility. The USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, in order not to give the Germans grounds to doubt the loyalty of the Soviet side to the pact signed on 23 August, committed a number of flagrant faux pas vis-a-vis Poland. In the first place, having learned on 8 September on the approach of the German troops to Warsaw, he hurried to congratulate the government of Nazi Germany on the taking of the Polish capital while Warsaw was still defending itself on 17 September; secondly, the assertion made in the note that "the Polish government has actually ceased to exist...contradicted the standards of international law...."⁴

The Soviet government closely followed the development of the tragic events in Poland, the people of which courageously resisted the superior Nazi forces. However, the refusal of England and France to carry out their Allied obligations vis-a-vis this country put it in a hopeless situation. The German troops, having defeated the main forces of the Polish Army, after 10 September advanced rapidly, drawing close to the territory of Western Belorussia and the Western Ukraine. Under these conditions, on 11 September, the USSR People's Commissar of Defense issued an order for the concentrating of the troops of the Kiev and Belorussian Special Military Districts on the Western frontier. On 16 September, by the end of the day, the German troops had reached the line of Radin, Lubartow, Lublin, Krasnostaw, Zamosze, Tomaszow, Gorodok, Drohobycz. On 14 September, they captured Brest, and on the 17th the Brest Fortress.⁵

In the morning of 17 September, troops of the Kiev and Belorussian Special Military Districts began a liberation

campaign. Headquarters of the Ukrainian and Belorussian Fronts were established for leadership of them. The Ukrainian Front which was under the command of Army Cmdr 1st Rank S.K. Timoshenko included: the 5th Army under the command of Div Cmdr I.G. Sovietnikov, the 6th Army under Corps Cmdr F.I. Golikov and the 12th Army under Army Cmdr 2d Rank I.V. Tyuleney; the Belorussian Front under the command of Army Cmdr 2d Rank M.P. Kovalev included: the 3d Army of Corps Cmdr V.I. Kuznetsov, the 11th Army of Div Cmdr N.P. Medvedev, the 10th Army of Corps Cmdr I.G. Zakharkin, the 4th Army of Div Cmdr V.I. Chuykov, the Front Horse-Mechanized Group of Corps Cmdr I.V. Boldin and the XXXIII Separate Rifle Corps consisting of the 52d Rifle Division and the Dnieper Naval Flotilla.⁶

The Soviet troops honorably carried out their international mission. They were strictly guided by the directives of the front military councils and these gave the tasks of the liberation campaign and spoke of the need to protect the local population from the police and Polish settlers, on protecting the property of the Polish, Ukrainian and Belorussian Citizens and on a loyal attitude toward the Polish servicemen and state officials who had not put up armed resistance. The Red Army units were prohibited from bombing the cities and population points by air, conducting artillery fire against them or violate the frontiers of Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. Great attention was given to explaining to the local population the reasons for the collapse of the Polish state and the aims of the Red Army's liberation mission.

The workers joyously greeted the Soviet troops. For almost 20 years the Ukrainians and Belorussians had been under the yoke of the Polish landowners and capitalists. Having seized the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia in 1920, the bourgeois rulers of Poland endeavored to turn their territory into their own colony: they carried out the violent polonization of the population, they closed the Ukrainian and Belorussian schools; they converted the Orthodox churches into Catholic ones; they confiscated the best land from the peasants, turning these over to Polish settlers (polonizers). The harsh exploitation, the national and social suppression forced the population of these oblasts into an extremely poverty-ridden situation, forcing many families to leave to Canada and other countries in search for work and the means of existence.

The working Ukrainians and Belorussians for many years had struggle courageously against their suppressors. Just in 1922, there were 878 partisan actions in the captured oblasts and in 1932 in the Lwow area and Volynia peasant revolts broke out and these were harshly suppressed by the troops and police. The communist parties of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia acted in the vanguard of the national liberation struggle. They were supported by the Communist Workers Party of Poland which recognized the right of self-determination for the Ukrainian and Belorussian population of these oblasts.

The news that the Soviet Union was coming to help spread rapidly through the Ukrainian and Belorussian cities and villages. Even before the arrival of the Soviet troops, they began establishing bodies of people's power, the revolutionary committees. In a number of places, the detachments of the worker guard and peasant militia organized by them clashed with bands of Polish as well as Ukrainian and Belorussian bourgeois nationalists. Everywhere the Soviet troops went the workers greeted them with the Slavic tradition of bread and salt, with flowers, red flags, posters and the slogans "Long Live the Red Army!" The report of the Political Directorate of the Ukrainian Front of 18 October stated that "the population of the Western Ukraine is greeting the Red Army units with great joy and red flags. The soldiers and commanders are invited home and some request that they be enlisted in the Red Army with their horses."⁷ Everywhere meetings and assemblies were held and the participants of these welcomed the arrival of the Soviet troops and demanded the annexation of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia with the Soviet republics.

The military councils of the fronts in their orders called on the men to deal humanely with the local population, to conduct explanatory work among them and not to permit national hostility between the Ukrainians, Belorussians and Poles. The appeal of the Ukrainian Front Military Council pointed out that each soldier, commander and political worker "should realize that in him the population for the first time is becoming acquainted with the Worker-Peasant Red Army [RKKA], with its discipline and organization. From the conduct of our men, the local population will judge the order in the Soviet Union. Any antisocial action plays into the hands of our enemies and discredits the Red Army."⁸ The commander of the Belorussian Front in his order condemned the instances which had occurred of arbitrary arrests, searches and requisitions in the liberated population points. He demanded that the army military councils conduct a merciless struggle against the obstinacy of the servicemen even to the point of holding the latter liable before the court.

A significant portion of the Polish population in the liberated regions also kindly received the arrival of the Soviet soldiers seeing in them defenders against the German Nazis. The Soviet vice-consul in Lwow, Sinitsyn, being a witness of the events, in a report of 17 September stated: "In conversations with the population of Lwow during the days of German bombings, great sympathy for the USSR began to be noticed. They asked why the Soviets do not act to liberate the remaining portion of the territory of the Western Ukraine around Lwow. In a conversation with a vice-elder of Lwow, Dembowski, the latter stated: "Why don't the Soviets occupy the rest of the territory, as we are Slavs and always can come to terms with one another. The Slavs are not accustomed to murdering one another but for Hitler this is something else, he is devastating all of Poland and he must be beaten together...."¹⁰ Something

similar was observed also in the Polish Army as a majority of its units did not put up resistance to the Red Army units. In a number of places, for example around Lwow, the Polish troops fought stubbornly against the Nazis while contrary to the intrigues of the reactionary officers, the garrison command headed by Gen Langer voluntarily turned the city over to the arriving Soviet units. "The policy carried out by Poland vis-a-vis the Soviet Union," stated Maj Kopa from the border point in Ostrog, "has collapsed, but now it is too late to speak about this. The eastern fortifications were unnecessary. The Germans have paralyzed all our vital centers."¹¹ Only individual groups of Polish troops, settlers and police refuse to lay down their arms, and took shelter in the forests and large population points, waiting for the clash between Germany and the Soviet Union. However, their hopes were in vain.

In a number of areas the German troops crossed the previously agreed-upon demarcation line, invading the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. This led in places to clashes. Thus, in the Lwow area, on 19 September, German troops opened fire against a Soviet tank brigade which was entering the city. In the city outskirts a fight broke out in the course of which the brigade lost 3 men killed, 5 wounded and 5 armored vehicles lost. The German losses were 4 men killed and 2 antitank guns put out of action.¹² This incident was not an error but rather an intentional provocation by the German Command. In order to avoid such instances, by mutual agreement a demarcation line was established and this was announced on 22 September in the Soviet-German communique: "The German government and the Soviet government have established a demarcation line between the German and Soviet armies and this runs along the Pissa River to its confluence on the Narew River; further along the Narew River to its confluence in the Bug River, then along the Bug river to its confluence in the Vistula River, then along the Vistula to the confluence of the San River in it and then along the San River to its sources."¹³ Agreement was also reached on the procedure for withdrawing German troops from the territory of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia.

On the occupied territory, the Nazi troops established a regime of terror, plunder and humiliation of the peaceful citizens, many of whom were arrested and executed. One of the reports from the Political Directorate of the Ukrainian Front pointed out that in the short stay on the territory of the Western Ukraine, the Germans by pillage and violence had aroused sharp hate from the local population.¹⁴ Many Nazi officers openly demonstrated hate for the Soviet Union and frightened the local inhabitants with the "Bolshevik threat." As can be seen from the archival documents, in the town of Stryj, one of them told the owner of the house in which he was temporarily living that Germany "concluded the treaty with the Russians as a diversionary measure and then we will settle up with the Poles and will deal with the Russians."¹⁵ Such statements were not isolated and the

Soviet commanders and political workers knew of this. Hence, the fact that joint parades of Soviet and German troops were held in Pinsk and Brest-Litovsk could not help but cause hostility.

By the end of September, the liberation of the territory of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia had ended with a total area of over 190,000² km. Over 12 million persons, including over 6 million Ukrainians and around 3 million Belorussians were saved from the threat of Nazi occupation. The rapid and decisive actions by the Soviet troops thwarted the plans of the Nazis to come directly up to the Soviet frontiers and form a puppet Ukrainian state to be called the "independent Polish and Galician Ukraine."¹⁶ At the insistence of the Soviet government, the German Command was forced to issue orders to the troops to pull back to the previously agreed-upon demarcation line and clear the areas occupied by them. Gen Halder called the day that this order was issued a day of "infamy for the German political leadership."¹⁷

On 28 September 1939, the German-Soviet Treaty on Friendship and the Frontier was signed in Moscow. Much has been written over this question in the Soviet and foreign press, even up to statements of the extreme viewpoint including accusations that the Soviet Union was carrying out a "fourth partition of Poland." However, if one is guided not by emotions and inventions, but rather the actual situation of those times is strictly considered, then it is possible to give any pat answer on the question of the given treaty. The situation which had arisen in Poland demanded a precise setting of the Western frontier of the Soviet Union. In the agreement of 22 September, it was only a question of the demarcation line proposed by the German side and which the Soviet government could not consider as its Western frontier and proposed that this be set approximately on the "so-called 'Curzon Line' proposed in 1919 by England, France, the United States and certain other countries as the frontier between Soviet Russia and Poland based on ethnographic grounds."¹⁸ This was the ethnic frontier between the Polish population, on the one hand, and the Ukrainian and Belorussian, on the other. In the autumn of 1939, D. Lloyd George wrote to the Polish ambassador in London that the USSR occupied "territories which are not Polish and which were taken by force by Poland after World War I.... It would be an act of criminal folly to put the Russian advance on the same level as the German advance."¹⁹

As a result of the liberation campaign of the Red Army and the Soviet-German Treaty, the Western frontier of the USSR was restored and this was now shifted some 250-300 km to the west. Germany was deprived of the possibility of using the territory of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia as a staging area for a war against our country. "The USSR government and the German government," pointed out Article 1 of the Treaty, "set as the boundary between the state interests of both sides on the territory of the former Polish state, a line which is drawn on the appended map and will be

described in greater detail in a supplementary protocol."²⁰ For the USSR this line was the state frontier which it reinforced and defended against any attempts to violate it. At the same time, the recognition by the then Soviet leaders headed by I.V. Stalin of the Treaty of 28 September 1939 as a treaty of "friendship" with Nazi Germany was a major political miscalculation, as "this provided grounds to speak about 'friendly' relations of the USSR with Nazi Germany, it actually whitewashed Nazism, it distorted class ideas in social and individual awareness and also had severe consequences both for Poland and for the USSR; the treaty violated the Leninist principles and caused harm to the international workers movement."²¹

The reasons for such an erroneous reorientation have yet to be clarified, since the anti-Soviet plans of the Nazis were no secret to the then leadership of the nation. Even on 23 August during the Soviet-German talks in Moscow on the concluding of the Nonaggression Pact, as is evident from the testimony of the Leader of the Legal Department of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs F. Gaus who participated in the talks, V.M. Molotov interrupted a speech by Ribbentrop when the latter began speaking about the spirit of "fraternity which links the Russian and German peoples." Molotov said: "There can be no fraternity between us, if you wish, let us talk about figures." In his letter to Hitler, Ribbentrop stated that I. Stalin who appeared at that moment, in answering his question, stated: "There can be no neutrality on our side as long as you yourselves continue to hatch aggressive plans against the USSR." He then went on to clarify: "We do not forget that an attack on us is your ultimate goal."²²

One could not help but be concerned by the fact that the frontier treaty had been worked out in an extremely short period of time, that the German representatives had easily made compromises and concessions in order to conclude it faster. Clearly I. Stalin believed that if "the Germans are not teased" then it will be possible to defer the German attack on the USSR and recover from the harm caused by the repressions of the military personnel and the mistakes in the preparing of the Armed Forces for war.

The Soviet press repeatedly condemned also the insulting attacks made during this period by V.M. Molotov on the Polish state. In a number of Soviet notes and statements and particularly in the speech of 31 October 1939 at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, V.M. Molotov called the liberation campaign of the Red Army a blow which would lead, in his words, together with the blow of the German troops to the collapse of the Polish state, that "monstrous child of the Versailles Treaty...."²³ This view contradicted the historical truth and the aims of the liberation campaign. The Red Army had entered the territory of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia not in the aim of waging war against Poland but rather for carrying out an international

mission vis-a-vis the Ukrainian and Belorussian populus in order to prevent its enslavement by the German Nazis.

The Soviet people never considered Poland the "monstrous child of the Versailles Treaty." As is known, the restoring of the independence of the Polish state became possible not as a consequence of the Versailles System, but rather as a result of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Precisely the Soviet government immediately after the victory of the October Revolution proposed the full right of self-determination to the Polish people. In the decree signed on 29 August 1918 by V.I. Lenin, it stated: "All treaties and acts concluded by the government of the former Russian Empire with the governments of the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire concerning the partitioning of Poland, due to their contradicting of the principle of the self-determination of nations and the revolutionary sense of justice of the Russian people who recognize for the Polish people the inalienable right to independence and unity are to be annulled by the present indisputably."²⁴ Our peoples have been linked by century-old friendship in the joint struggle against the German invaders and the Tsarist autocracy. Subsequent events were to show that the Soviet people had done everything possible to liberate Poland from fascist suppression and provided help in restoring a strong Polish state. However, the system of the cult of personality and the insulting attacks made against Poland sowed the seeds of mistrust which even now cause harm to international relations. The CPSU and the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] are taking active measures to eliminate the "blank spots" in Soviet-Polish relations and to strengthen friendship between our peoples. The joint Soviet-Polish statement of 14 July 1988 points out that "deciphering the 'blank spots' relates not only to the dramatic but also to the little-known glorious pages in the history of collaboration disclosing the joint struggle for national and social liberation, liberty and independence of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Poland."²⁵

The change in the Western frontiers of the Soviet Union in accord with the legitimate rights to the territories of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia was a significant contribution not only to the cause of strengthening the security of our motherland but also to the general cause of all the peace-loving peoples fighting against Nazi aggression. This was recognized by many politicians in the West. In his radio speech of 1 October 1939, W. Churchill who then held the post of the British First Lord of the Admiralty admitted that the moving of the Soviet frontier to the West created a major barrier on the path of the German troops to the East. "The fact that the Russian armies," he pointed out, "were to be on this line was completely essential for the security of Russia against the German threat. In any event, the positions had been taken and the Eastern Front has been established and this Nazi Germany will not dare attack."²⁶ The French ambassador in Warsaw viewed the developing situation in the same manner.

On the liberated lands, bodies of people's power were established and these became the centers of the political, economic and cultural life of the people. They assumed the carrying out of state and social functions and in a short period of time established revolutionary order: they organized the supply of the urban population with food products; they set up trade in the cities and villages; they set prices for food and industrial goods; they combated speculation and at enterprises organized worker control committees. In the liberated villages, peasant committees and detachments of volunteer peasant militia were organized and these protected property and grain against theft and the landowner lands which had been distributed among the peasants.

All the Soviet republics, particularly the Ukraine, Belorussia and the RSFSR, provided material aid to the liberated oblasts, they shared the experience of national economic and cultural development and sent industrial equipment, machinery and consumer goods.

The Soviet government provided the workers in the liberated territories with an opportunity themselves to determine the question of the form of power. At numerous meetings and assemblies they spoke about the establishing of Soviet power. The opinion of the predominant majority of the population was voiced by the worker Petrik at a meeting of the Galicia Plant in Drohobycz: "Fresh in the memory of all of us are the punitive expeditions of the Polish nobles. For this reason it is a joy to feel today that the police whip is no longer rising over your back. This freedom and joy was brought to us by our blood brothers, the workers of the Soviet Union and the Red Army. When we are asked today what power we want, then there can be only one reply—Soviet power."²⁷

In October 1939, universal elections were held for the delegates to the people's assemblies of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia and these were conducted on a democratic basis with the active involvement of the voters. The People's Assembly of the Western Ukraine on 28 October and that of Western Belorussia on 29 October adopted declarations on the proclaiming of Soviet power and a request that they be admitted to the USSR and the Western Ukraine was to be incorporated in the Ukrainian SSR and Western Belorussia in the Belorussian SSR.²⁸ On 1 November 1939, the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Law Governing the Incorporation of the Western Ukraine in the USSR and Its Annexation With the Ukrainian SSR and on 2 November the Law Incorporating Western Belorussia as Part of the USSR and Its Annexation by the Belorussian SSR. This act concluded the uniting of the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples within the USSR. However, the Polish emigre government in London refused to recognize the decisions of the people's assemblies and the frontier between the USSR and Germany as defined by the treaty of 28 September. Its referrals to the Fourth Hague Convention were invalid since it was a question of an occupation regime and the entry of the Soviet troops into the Western Ukraine and Western

Belorussia was not an occupation but rather the liberating of territory which had been violently appropriated from the Soviet state by Poland. On 4 December 1941, the Soviet Union and Poland signed a Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Aid. After the liberation of Poland from the Nazi invaders where the Soviet Union played the decisive role, on 16 August 1945, a treaty was signed which once and for all defined the frontier between People's Poland and the USSR and this basically ran along the so-called Curzon Line with a certain concession in favor of Poland.

The establishing of Soviet power in the Western oblasts of the Ukraine and Belorussia created favorable conditions for their economic, social and cultural development. All forms of exploitation and national suppression and unemployment were eliminated and the basic means of production were nationalized. The workers became equal citizens of the Soviet state and took an active part in socialist construction.

The Soviet government showed great concern for the Polish population of these oblasts as well as for the Polish refugees. The basic mass of the Poles who found a second homeland in the USSR joined in the active life of the Soviet people and participated in the construction of Soviet power in the liberated oblasts. Many of them were elected deputies to the superior bodies of power: some 127 Polish deputies were elected to the People's Assembly of Western Belorussia and 44 in the Western Ukraine.²⁹ In the USSR, 17 titles of newspapers and 2 journals were published in Poland, and Polish schools, creative unions and publishing houses were established. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the command-administrative system and the unjustified Stalinist repressions overshadowed the positive features which the Soviet nation had given to the population of the liberated oblasts.

The unification of the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples in united Soviet republics was joyously welcomed not only by the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples but also by all the USSR peoples, the workers of Poland and other nations, as this historical fact eliminated the injustice which had been imposed by imperialism on the Ukrainian, Belorussian and Polish peoples and which impeded the uniting of their forces in the fight for freedom and security.

Footnotes

1. "Dokumenty i materialy po istorii sovetsko-polskikh otnosheniy" [Documents and Materials on the History of Soviet-Polish Relations], Moscow, Nauka, Vol 7, 1973, p 178.
2. "Documents diplomatiques francais, 1932-1939," Paris, Series 2, Folio 18, p 498.
3. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 33987, inv. 1, file 161, sheet 1.

* The memoirs of N. Sharonov on these events will be published in future issues of our journal.

4. "On the Eve and the Beginning of World War II," PRAVDA, 25 May 1989.

5. TsGASA, folio 37977, inv. 1, file 187, sheet 85.

6. Ibid., folio 35086, inv. 1, file 664, sheets 229, 237.

7. Ibid., folio 9, inv. 29, file 432, sheet 113.

8. Ibid., file 504, sheets 3-4.

9. Ibid., folio 35086, inv. 1, file 7, sheets 44-45.

10. Ibid., folio 33987, inv. 3, file 1213, sheets 158-159.

11. Ibid., sheet 161.

12. Ibid., folio 37977, inv. 1, file 193, sheets 99-100.

13. Ibid., inv. 3, file 1226, sheet 124.

14. Ibid., folio 9, inv. 29, file 432, sheet 164.

15. Ibid., sheet 165.

16. L. Bezymenskiy, "Osobaya papka 'Barbarossa'" [The Special Barbarossa File], Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1972, p 148.

17. Col Gen F. Halder, "Voyennyy dnevniki" [War Diary], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 1, 1968, p 125, translated from the German.

18. "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR. 1917-1976" [History of Soviet Foreign Policy. 1917-1976], Moscow, Nauka, Vol 1, 1976, p 399.

19. PRAVDA, 1 September 1988.

20. TsGASA, folio 33987, inv. 3, file 1226, sheet 22.

21. PRAVDA, 25 May 1989.

22. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 24 August 1989.

23. PRAVDA, 25 May 1989.

24. "Dokumenty i materialy....," Moscow, Nauka, Vol 1, 1983, pp 418-419.

25. "Vizit Generalnogo sekretarya TsK KPSS M.S. Gorbachev v Polskuyu Narodnuyu Respubliku 11-14 iyulya 1988 goda: Dokumenty i materialy" [Visit of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev to the Polish People's Republic 11-14 July 1988: Documents and Materials], Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, p 181.

26. W. Churchill, "The Second World War," London, Vol I, 1949, p 449.

27. TsGASA, folio 37977, inv. 1, file 187, sheet 53.

28. "Dokumenty i materialy....," Vol 7, pp 179-183.

29. "Bratstvo po oruzhiyu" [Fraternity in Arms], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1975, p 64.

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Articles Not Translated from VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 9, Sep 89

904P0003G Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY

ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 89

(Signed to press 9 Sep 89)

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Publication Data

904P0003H Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 89 (Signed to press 9 Sep 89) p 1

English title: MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

Russian title: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL

Editor-in-Chief: V.I. Filatov

Publishing house: Krasnaya Zvezda

Place of publication: Moscow

Date of publication: September 1989

Signed to press: 9 September 1989

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1989

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25 May 90